Cox v. Morley

Background

Sampson Cox, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Nurse Assistant Constance Lescano; Dr. Mikhail Gusman; Nurses Kyle Henry, Judith Ann Camara, and Abigail Yerkes; Nurse Administrator Diane Hinton; Dr. Yelena Korobkova; Nurse Carol Chiocchi; Superintendent William Keyser; and three unidentified medical personnel. The claims remaining in this case concerned treatment at Sullivan Correctional Facility. Claims concerning Great Meadow and Clinton Correctional Facilities had previously been separated and transferred to another federal court, and claims against the three unidentified defendants had been dismissed without prejudice.

Cox alleged that he had experienced skin symptoms, burning, itching, tingling, nerve twitching, and a painful lump on his right testicle. He described multiple encounters with the defendants from May 2018 through September 2019. He alleged that some defendants refused to examine him or told him to stop coming to the medical unit, that other defendants provided inadequate treatment, and that certain medical records, a medication-refusal form, or photographs were falsified. He also alleged that Superintendent Keyser knew about his complaints and failed to supervise the other defendants.

Cox sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state actors for violations of federal constitutional rights. He alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and asserted negligence claims under state law. He sought injunctive relief and damages of $16 million against the defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Defendants’ Motion and Legal Standards

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning its legal authority to decide a case. Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to make a claim legally plausible. For purposes of the motion, the court accepted the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpreted Cox’s allegations liberally.

For an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim, Cox had to allege both an objectively serious medical need and that a defendant knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. The court explained that a disagreement about treatment, or ordinary medical malpractice, is not necessarily a constitutional violation. A claim against a supervisor under Section 1983 also requires allegations showing the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation.

Eighth Amendment Claims

The court dismissed without prejudice Cox’s individual-capacity claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Although Cox described persistent symptoms and many medical visits, the court found that he did not adequately allege what medical needs were disregarded or that the treatment provided was inadequate. The court noted that Lescano examined Cox’s scalp, monitored his blood pressure and temperature, provided medication, and referred him to a doctor. It also noted that Cox alleged Dr. Gusman performed multiple examinations and prescribed medication.

The court similarly found that Cox did not sufficiently allege that Yerkes, Hinton, Camara, Korobkova, or Henry either refused treatment or acted with the required state of mind. Cox continued to visit the medical unit and receive medical attention and treatment, according to the allegations reviewed by the court.

The court also dismissed without prejudice Cox’s claims that Lescano, Chiocchi, Korobkova, and Henry fabricated medical records. The court stated that falsification of medical records alone generally does not create an independent Eighth Amendment claim. Cox had not adequately connected the alleged falsification to deliberate indifference to his medical needs or alleged facts showing the required culpable state of mind.

Cox’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims were dismissed without prejudice because the court found them duplicative of his medical-care claims. His Eighth Amendment claim against Superintendent Keyser was also dismissed without prejudice because the complaint did not allege his involvement in Cox’s medical treatment and relied on conclusory statements about supervision.

Fourteenth Amendment and Supervisory Claims

The court dismissed without prejudice Cox’s procedural due process claim based on Keyser’s handling of grievances. Cox alleged only that he received unfavorable grievance decisions and did not describe how the grievance process failed to provide constitutionally sufficient procedures.

The court dismissed Cox’s substantive due process claim as to all defendants. It reasoned that the Eighth Amendment specifically addressed the alleged inadequate medical care, so the more general substantive due process theory could not separately govern the same allegations.

The court also declined to impose supervisory liability on Keyser because holding a supervisory position alone does not establish personal involvement in a constitutional violation.

Official-Capacity and State-Law Claims

The court held that damages claims against the defendants in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which generally prevents federal courts from hearing damages claims against a state and its instrumentalities without a valid exception. Those claims were dismissed with prejudice.

The court treated Cox’s negligence allegations as medical-malpractice claims. It held that New York Corrections Law § 24 barred damages claims against the alleged Department of Corrections and Community Supervision employees in their individual capacities for acts within the scope of their employment. Those state-law claims were dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Cox’s state-law claims against the defendants in their official capacities, and dismissed those claims with prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Roman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Cox’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the defendants in their individual capacities were dismissed without prejudice. Cox’s negligence claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, and all claims against the defendants in their official capacities, were dismissed with prejudice.

The court granted Cox leave to file an amended complaint concerning the claims dismissed without prejudice by August 8, 2022. If he did not timely amend and could not show good cause, those claims would be deemed dismissed with prejudice.