Garcia De Leon v. New York University

Background

Nelcy Mabel Garcia De Leon filed a proposed class action against New York University (NYU) concerning the University’s decision to move classes online and curtail or cancel in-person activities and campus services during the spring 2020 semester. She asserted breach-of-contract, unjust-enrichment, and New York General Business Law claims and sought refunds of tuition and fees.

The court had previously dismissed the claims based on the alleged failure to provide in-person instruction, the New York General Business Law claims, and the request for an injunction. The remaining claims concerned fees paid for services and access to campus facilities. Garcia De Leon moved to certify a “Fees Class” consisting of people who paid fees for NYU services, facilities, resources, events, or activities that were not provided in whole or in part. She also asked to be appointed class representative and asked the Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC to be appointed class counsel.

Class-certification standards

Class certification is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed representative must show numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. In general terms, the class must be large enough that joining every member individually would be impractical; the members must share important legal or factual issues; the representative’s claims must be typical of the class; and the representative and proposed lawyers must fairly protect the class’s interests. For a damages class, common issues must also predominate over individual issues, and a class action must be superior to other ways of resolving the dispute.

Reasons for denying class certification

The court accepted that the proposed class was sufficiently numerous but concluded that Garcia De Leon did not establish commonality or typicality. NYU charged more than 60 different school- and course-based fees for different purposes. Students paid different fees, and individual NYU schools and programs made different refund decisions. The court therefore found no single issue that could resolve the proposed class’s claims in one common determination.

The court also found that Garcia De Leon’s circumstances differed substantially from those of many proposed class members. She was a graduate student at NYU’s Rockland County campus, where 88 students were enrolled in her program during the relevant semester. She paid a Social Work Registration and Services Fee and a $30 art-supplies fee. The court found that her alleged loss of access to services and facilities was different from the alleged injuries of students who attended classes or used facilities at NYU’s New York City campus or who paid different fees for different services.

The court further held that individual questions would predominate. Resolving the proposed class’s claims would require examining each student’s fees, the services or supplies associated with those fees, the representations made by the relevant NYU school or program, any refund issued, and whether the services were provided. The court stated that these individualized contract and refund questions made class treatment inefficient and inappropriate.

Adequacy of the proposed representative and lawyers

The court found that Garcia De Leon was not an adequate class representative. It cited conflicting testimony about her visits to NYU’s New York City campus, her alleged contacts with NYU health and career services, her inability to identify precisely which fees were at issue, and her failure to comply fully with court-ordered discovery. The court also found that she had not clearly disclosed all of the law firms involved in her representation and did not appear to have a firm understanding of who her lawyers were or how they were representing her.

The court separately found the proposed class counsel inadequate. It questioned the experience of Roy T. Willey, IV of the Anastopoulo firm in serving as class counsel, noted that the engagement letter identified multiple firms and a proposed co-counsel arrangement that had not been disclosed to or approved by the court, and found that the lawyers’ agreement appeared to condition their continued representation on class certification and their appointment as class counsel. The court also criticized counsel’s handling of the complaint and class-related discovery.

Disposition and jurisdiction

The court denied the motion for class certification and denied the accompanying motions to appoint Garcia De Leon as lead plaintiff and the proposed lawyers as class counsel. Because the action could not be maintained as a class action, the court concluded that the only asserted basis for federal jurisdiction—the Class Action Fairness Act—no longer supported federal jurisdiction. The court ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the dismissal did not bar Garcia De Leon from bringing her claims in a state court with jurisdiction.

The court stated that a sanctions motion against plaintiff’s lawyers remained pending. It therefore directed the clerk to terminate the class-certification motions and enter the dismissal order, but did not close the case while the sanctions matter remained to be decided.