Crowley v. Jones

Background

Shane Crowley, a photographer, took photographs of Joseph Guillermo Jones, who performs as “Jim Jones.” Crowley sent one photograph to Jones’s manager, Tony Villegas. In text messages, Crowley asked that the images be credited if used, specifying credit on the web and a tag on Instagram. Villegas responded, “Ok bet. Got you.”

Crowley alleged that a modified and uncredited version of the photograph was used as artwork for the 2021 album “The Fraud Department,” including on digital platforms and physical albums. He alleged that these uses exceeded the limited, nonexclusive license granted in the text-message exchange. His complaint asserted two copyright claims: direct copyright infringement and vicarious or contributory copyright infringement. It also asserted a claim under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, alleging that defendants removed copyright-management information and added their own names and logo.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally plausible claim. They argued that the text messages gave them a license broad enough to cover their use of the photograph. They also argued that Crowley had not adequately pleaded a Digital Millennium Copyright Act violation.

Copyright Claims and Scope of the License

Judge Castel denied the motion to dismiss Counts One and Two. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged unauthorized use because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the license covered credited use on the web and Instagram but did not cover use as album artwork on apps, streaming platforms, online retail sites, or physical albums.

The court considered the text-message exchange because it appeared to be integral to the complaint. It concluded, however, that the exchange did not establish at the pleading stage that “web” included all of the online platforms and applications at issue. The court also noted that Crowley’s specific reference to Instagram could support an understanding that app use was limited to Instagram.

The court declined to consider factual assertions in defense declarations that were not properly considered on a motion to dismiss, including assertions that the photograph was not used on the physical album versions. The complaint’s allegations and retail-site screenshots were sufficient to make the alleged physical-album use plausible.

The court also rejected dismissal based on the defendants’ arguments about photographer credit and consideration. Crowley alleged that credit was a condition of the license, rather than merely a promise whose violation would create only a contract claim. The court found that Crowley’s use of the word “if” plausibly supported treating credit as a condition. It stated that the final interpretation of the license would be better addressed after discovery on a fuller factual record.

Statutory Damages and Attorneys’ Fees

The court granted the motion to dismiss Crowley’s requests for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. The court took judicial notice that the photograph was registered on April 19, 2021. The complaint alleged that the digital album was released on February 19, 2021, and described continuing infringement before and after registration.

Applying 17 U.S.C. § 412, the court held that statutory damages and attorneys’ fees were unavailable because the alleged continuing infringement began before the copyright’s effective registration date.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act Claim

The court granted the motion to dismiss Count Three. The complaint alleged that defendants provided or distributed false copyright-management information by placing “Jim Jones,” “Harry Fraud,” and a logo on the album artwork. The court explained that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act requires allegations that the defendants knew the information was false and provided or distributed it with the intent to facilitate or conceal infringement.

The court held that defendants’ placement of their names on the altered album artwork did not support a claim under the statute because the complaint itself described the album artwork as a derivative work—a distinct work based on the original photograph. Under the authorities discussed by the court, associating a defendant’s name with a derivative work does not violate the statute, even if the derivative work infringes the original copyright.

The court also dismissed the claim that defendants intentionally removed or altered copyright-management information. The complaint did not identify any such information on the original photograph. The court noted that the photograph attached to the complaint showed no visible copyright-management information, and the complaint did not allege that such information was included in the photograph’s metadata.

Because the Digital Millennium Copyright Act claim was not plausibly pleaded, the court also dismissed Crowley’s request for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees under that statute.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

Crowley’s request for leave to amend was denied. The court noted that he had already amended the complaint twice and had previously received notice of alleged pleading deficiencies. It found his latest request vague and nonspecific because he did not explain the basis for another amendment.

Judge Castel’s final disposition was: the defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied as to Counts One and Two; granted as to Crowley’s requests for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act; granted as to Count Three; and denied as to Crowley’s request for leave to amend. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion.