Steele v. United States

Background

Joseph Steele was convicted after a jury trial of possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (2). The court sentenced him to 180 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, supplied the sentencing enhancement at issue.

The Second Circuit affirmed Steele’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Steele then filed a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a statute that permits a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence. The district court denied that motion after deciding that Steele had not been deprived of effective assistance of counsel and had not shown prejudice.

Steele later filed this second § 2255 motion without a lawyer. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden meant his prior conviction for first-degree robbery under New York Penal Law § 160.15(4) no longer qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA enhancement. He asked to be resentenced without that enhancement.

Legal standard

A second or successive § 2255 motion generally requires authorization from a three-judge panel of the appropriate federal court of appeals. Under § 2255(h), the motion must rely either on newly discovered evidence meeting the statute’s demanding standard or on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.

Because the district court had already decided a § 2255 motion concerning Steele’s same conviction and sentence, the court treated the new motion as second or successive. Steele had not obtained the required certification from the Second Circuit, so the district court lacked authority to decide the motion. The court had discretion to transfer it to the Second Circuit for a certification decision, but could decline to do so when the motion clearly failed the statutory requirements.

Court’s reasoning

The court explained that Borden held that an offense requiring a mental state of recklessness does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s relevant definition. But the court did not decide whether Steele’s robbery conviction actually qualified as a violent felony after Borden. Instead, it held that Borden addressed a statutory question, not a constitutional one. Therefore, Borden could not satisfy § 2255(h)(2)’s requirement of a new, retroactive constitutional rule for a second or successive motion.

Because Steele’s motion did not satisfy either statutory basis for a second or successive motion, the court declined to transfer it to the Second Circuit for certification.

Disposition

Judge Victor Marrero denied Steele’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The opinion does not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice.