Iosilevich v. Walmart Inc.

Background

Ilya Feliksovich Iosilevich, appearing without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits claims for constitutional violations by persons acting under state law, along with claims under state law. The defendants named in the complaint included Walmart, Inc.; Walmart employee Joseph Negron; unidentified Walmart employees; the State of New York; the New York State Police; state police officials and troopers; Westchester County; County Executive George Latimer; the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office; and District Attorney Miriam E. Rocah. The court had granted Iosilevich permission to proceed without prepaying filing fees.

Screening standard

Because Iosilevich was proceeding without prepaying fees, the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a legally supportable claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also stated that it had to read a self-represented litigant’s complaint broadly and interpret it to raise the strongest claims suggested by the allegations.

Dismissed claims

The court dismissed the claims against the State of New York and the New York State Police. It held that New York had not waived its immunity from federal-court suits, Congress had not removed that immunity through § 1983, and the defendants were immune from the requested monetary relief. The court therefore concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.

The court dismissed the claims against the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office because, under New York law, the office does not have a separate legal existence from the District Attorney and therefore cannot be sued as a separate entity. The court dismissed the claims against County Executive George Latimer because Iosilevich did not allege facts showing Latimer’s personal involvement in the events. A government official cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because the official supervises someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

The court dismissed the claims against District Attorney Miriam E. Rocah because the challenged conduct involved actions taken within the scope of her prosecutorial duties. Prosecutors have absolute immunity from damages claims for conduct closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. The court characterized those claims as seeking money from an immune defendant and, consequently, as frivolous. The opinion also states that Iosilevich could not use this case to force prosecutors to initiate or control a criminal proceeding.

Identification of unnamed defendants

The court applied a procedure allowing a self-represented litigant to obtain assistance identifying an unknown defendant. It found that the complaint provided enough information for the New York State Police to identify the unnamed state troopers who allegedly assisted Trooper Reicherter in arresting Iosilevich on September 1, 2020.

The court ordered the New York State Attorney General, as the attorney for and agent of the New York State Police, to determine the names, badge numbers, and service addresses of the unnamed troopers and provide that information to Iosilevich and the court by September 6, 2022. Within 30 days after receiving the information, Iosilevich was directed to file an amended complaint naming the troopers. The amended complaint would replace, rather than add to, the original complaint, and the court would screen it before directing service if necessary.

Service and appeal

Because Iosilevich had permission to proceed without prepaying fees, the court directed the Clerk of Court to prepare service forms and summonses for Walmart, Inc., Joseph Negron, Trooper John T. Reicherter, Kevin P. Bruen, and Westchester County, and to provide the necessary documents to the U.S. Marshals Service. The court stated that service would generally need to occur within 90 days after the summonses were issued, and that Iosilevich could request an extension if needed.

The court certified that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal. The order does not state that the dismissed claims were dismissed with or without prejudice.