Campbell v. United States

Background

Michael Campbell moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed unlawfully. Campbell had pleaded guilty to two firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count One involved using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during and in relation to assault in aid of racketeering. Count Two involved using, carrying, and possessing a firearm that was discharged during and in relation to armed robbery.

Campbell’s offenses arose from two incidents: the retaliatory murder of Jordan Jones on July 5, 2009, and the December 26, 2010, robbery and murder of Patrick Woodburn. The court sentenced Campbell to the mandatory minimum of 30 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. Campbell did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Campbell filed an initial placeholder motion after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague. The court stayed the motion while courts considered related challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Supreme Court later held in United States v. Davis that § 924(c)(3)(B), the statute’s risk-of-force or residual clause, was also unconstitutionally vague.

Campbell’s Arguments

Campbell argued that his two § 924(c) convictions had to be vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery and assault in aid of racketeering no longer qualified as crimes of violence. He also argued that those offenses did not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force under § 924(c)(3)(A), known as the elements clause.

Court’s Analysis

The court first explained that the record showed Count Two was based on completed Hobbs Act robbery, not attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The court relied on the Second Circuit’s holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property.

The court also ruled that assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause. It reasoned that using or brandishing a gun during that offense necessarily involves force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.

Because both offenses supporting Campbell’s firearm convictions remained crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), the court concluded that his § 2255 motion lacked merit.

Disposition

Judge John F. Keenan denied Campbell’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Campbell had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and directed the clerk to terminate the motion in the criminal case and close the related civil case.