Doe v. State University of New York Purchase College

Background

John Doe, proceeding under a pseudonym, sued the State University of New York Purchase College under Title IX and New York law. He alleged that the college conducted a biased investigation and wrongly adjudicated a female classmate’s sexual-assault complaint against him. He also alleged that, after he returned to campus, other students harassed and ostracized him and that the college failed to prevent or address that conduct. He alleged that he withdrew from the college on October 8, 2018.

A college hearing board found that Doe violated the school’s sexual-assault rule, although it found the complainant’s testimony about her inability to consent conflicting and unreliable. The board imposed several sanctions. In an earlier related proceeding in New York state court, the Appellate Division ruled that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence, vacated the sanctions, dismissed the charge, and ordered the college to remove references to the finding from Doe’s academic record. That court did not decide Doe’s damages claims.

The court also ruled that the State University of New York was the proper defendant because Purchase College was a constituent campus of the SUNY system rather than a separate legal entity.

Claims and motion

Doe brought eight causes of action: four under Title IX—erroneous outcome and selective enforcement, deliberate indifference, hostile environment, and retaliation—and four under New York law involving the state Constitution, express and implied contracts, promissory estoppel, and reliance. He sought declaratory relief and damages.

The defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court treated the timeliness argument as a Rule 12(b)(6) argument and treated the state-law immunity argument as a jurisdictional issue.

Title IX claims concerning the adjudication

Title IX does not contain its own limitations period. The court applied New York’s three-year period for personal-injury claims and determined that the claims concerning the investigation and adjudication accrued no later than November 2, 2017, when Doe filed the earlier state-court proceeding. Without tolling, those claims expired before Doe filed this federal action on October 12, 2021.

The court rejected Doe’s argument that a stipulation in the earlier state-court proceeding waived the statute-of-limitations defense. The stipulation stated that SUNY Purchase would not file a limitations, jurisdictional, or claim-preclusion motion in “this matter.” The court interpreted that language as applying only to the earlier state-court proceeding, not to later federal litigation.

The court agreed with Doe that New York executive orders issued during the COVID-19 emergency tolled the limitations period for Title IX claims for 228 days. That tolling extended the deadline for the adjudication-related claims only to June 18, 2021, which was still before Doe filed this action. The court also rejected application of the continuing-violation doctrine, finding that the adjudication-related conduct in 2017 and the alleged treatment after Doe returned to campus in 2018 were separate sets of acts rather than one continuing violation.

The court therefore dismissed with prejudice the Title IX claims concerning the adjudication of the sexual-assault allegations as barred by the statute of limitations.

Title IX claims concerning treatment after Doe returned

The court concluded that the COVID-19 executive orders saved Doe’s Title IX claims concerning his treatment after returning to campus. Those claims were based on conduct that continued until his withdrawal on October 8, 2018, and the court stated in its conclusion that they survived the motion to dismiss. The court did not decide whether Doe would ultimately prevail on those claims.

New York-law claims

The court held that SUNY is a state agency protected by the Eleventh Amendment, which generally prevents suits against a state or its agencies in federal court unless the state waived that protection or Congress removed it. The court found that New York had not waived its immunity for Doe’s claims under the New York Constitution, breach-of-contract claims, or promissory-estoppel and reliance claims.

The court rejected Doe’s argument that the earlier state-court stipulation was an express and unequivocal waiver of immunity. It interpreted the stipulation as addressing only the earlier Article 78 proceeding, not a future federal lawsuit. The court therefore dismissed with prejudice Doe’s state-law claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Title IX claims concerning the adjudication of the complaint and all state-law claims were dismissed with prejudice. The Title IX claims concerning Doe’s treatment after returning to campus survived.