Pittman v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc.

Background

Aneisha Pittman and Susan Ukpere filed a proposed class action against Chick-fil-A, Inc. They alleged that Chick-fil-A advertised delivery fees of about $2.99 or $3.99 but applied a separate 25-to-30-percent markup to food ordered for delivery. According to the complaint, the markup appeared in the order subtotal but was not disclosed as a delivery charge. The plaintiffs asserted claims under New York’s General Business Law, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

Ukpere placed delivery orders from New Jersey restaurants while in New Jersey. Pittman placed a delivery order from a New York restaurant while in New York. Chick-fil-A moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), which addresses personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The plaintiffs also asked for permission to file a Second Amended Complaint.

Rulings on Ukpere’s Claims

The court dismissed Ukpere’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. It concluded that Chick-fil-A was incorporated and headquartered in Georgia, so the allegations did not establish general jurisdiction in New York. The court also concluded that Ukpere’s claims did not establish specific jurisdiction because her purchases and alleged injuries occurred in New Jersey and had no connection to New York.

The court rejected Ukpere’s request for jurisdictional discovery because her suggestion that she might have received Chick-fil-A marketing or placed an order in New York was speculative. The court also agreed that the rule requiring a connection between a named class-action plaintiff’s claims and the forum applied to Ukpere’s claims.

Rulings on Pittman’s Claims

The court dismissed Pittman’s New York General Business Law Section 349 claim for failure to allege a legally recognizable injury. Section 349 prohibits deceptive business practices and permits an injured person to sue. The court explained that a plaintiff generally must allege that, because of a materially misleading practice, she purchased something without receiving its full value. Pittman alleged that she would not have bought the food had she known about the markup and that she paid more for delivery than advertised. The court held that, as pleaded, the alleged deception was also being used as the alleged injury, which was insufficient.

The court dismissed Pittman’s breach-of-contract claim because the complaint did not identify the specific or essential terms of a contract, or the particular provisions Chick-fil-A allegedly breached. The court also dismissed any claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as duplicative because it relied on the same facts as the contract claim.

The court dismissed Pittman’s unjust-enrichment claim as duplicative. It relied on the same factual allegations and damages as her other claims and did not allege separate damages.

Class Allegations and Proposed Amendment

Because all of the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed, the court did not address Chick-fil-A’s arguments about the sufficiency of the nationwide class allegations.

The court denied the plaintiffs’ request to file a Second Amended Complaint. It found that the proposed amendments would be futile: they did not establish personal jurisdiction over Ukpere’s claims, did not cure the injury problem in Pittman’s Section 349 claim, did not identify specific contract terms or breached provisions, and continued to make the unjust-enrichment claim duplicative.

Disposition

Judge Victor Marrero granted Chick-fil-A’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and denied the plaintiffs’ request to file a Second Amended Complaint. The clerk was directed to terminate all motions and close the case. The opinion does not state whether the dismissals were with or without prejudice.