Spurck v. Demet's Candy Company, LLC
- Nelson Roman
- 7:21-cv-05506
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Spurck v. Demet’s Candy, Judge Roman granted the company’s motion to dismiss the product-labeling lawsuit.
Jessicca Spurck and the proposed class members’ claims were ended when the court granted Demet’s Candy Company, LLC’s motion to dismiss and closed the action.
What happened
In Spurck v. Demet’s Candy Company, LLC, Jessicca Spurck claimed that pretzels labeled “White Fudge” were misleading because the coating used more vegetable oils than dairy ingredients and lacked the milk fat she expected. She brought claims under New York consumer-protection laws, warranty laws, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and other state-law theories, on behalf of a proposed class.
The court concluded that a reasonable consumer would not understand “White Fudge” to promise a particular recipe or a specific amount of milk fat. It also found that the complaint did not allege the special relationship needed for negligent misrepresentation, timely notice of a warranty breach, or enough facts showing fraud or unjust enrichment. Because the underlying claims failed, the request for an injunction also failed.
Judge Nelson S. Roman granted Demet’s Candy Company, LLC’s motion to dismiss. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion, enter judgment, end the action, and close the case.
The detailed version
- Spurck v. Demet's Candy Company, LLC · No. 7:21-cv-05506
- Nelson Roman
- July 27, 2022
Background
Jessicca Spurck filed a proposed class action against Demet’s Candy Company, LLC, which the opinion says is now known as Star Brands North America, Inc. Spurck alleged that the company manufactured, labeled, marketed, and sold Flipz-brand pretzels represented as covered in “White Fudge.” According to the complaint, the coating contained sugar, vegetable oils, milk, skim milk powder, soy lecithin, and artificial flavor, and contained more vegetable-fat ingredients than dairy ingredients. Spurck alleged that consumers expected fudge to contain essential dairy and milk-fat ingredients, including butter, and that she would not have bought the product had she known the representation was allegedly false.
Spurck asserted claims under Sections 349 and 350 of New York’s General Business Law, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, fraud, and unjust enrichment. She also sought injunctive relief. Demet’s Candy moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.
Court’s analysis
The court held that the product label was not misleading as a matter of law for purposes of the New York consumer-protection claims. It reasoned that a reasonable consumer would not infer from “White Fudge,” without additional representations on the package, that the product used a specific fudge recipe or contained a particular ingredient. The court therefore concluded that Spurck had not sufficiently alleged that the label was deceptive under Sections 349 and 350.
The negligent-misrepresentation claim also failed. New York law requires a special or relationship similar to a direct contractual relationship that creates a duty to provide accurate information. The court found that the allegations described only an ordinary buyer-seller relationship, which was insufficient.
The court dismissed the express-warranty claim because Spurck did not adequately allege that she gave timely notice of the claimed breach before filing suit. The statement that she “provided or will provide” notice was equivocal, and complaints by regulators, competitors, and consumers did not show that Spurck herself gave the required notice. The court dismissed the implied-warranty claim on the same notice ground. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim failed because it depended on a viable state-law express or implied warranty claim.
The fraud claim failed because the court had already determined that the label did not communicate that the product’s white fudge coating derived from milk fat. The court also found that the complaint offered only conclusory allegations about fraudulent intent. The unjust-enrichment claim failed because Spurck had not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer was misled or deceived, making any benefit to the company insufficiently alleged as unjust. The request for injunctive relief failed because it depended on the underlying claims.
Disposition
The court granted Demet’s Candy Company, LLC’s motion to dismiss. The opinion does not state that the motion or any claim was granted or dismissed with or without prejudice. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 11, enter judgment accordingly, terminate the action, and close the case. Judge Nelson S. Roman entered the order on July 27, 2022.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.