Craven v. City of New York

Background

William Craven, a New York City Police Department sergeant, sued the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, Chief James Secreto, and John Does 1–5. He alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Craven alleged that the defendants repeatedly transferred or suspended him after legal disputes involving the mother of his child. He claimed that these actions were based on his age and his status as a victim of domestic violence, and that they were part of a practice he called “road therapy,” which allegedly pushed older employees toward retirement. He also alleged retaliation after he filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge and after he filed this lawsuit.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but did not accept legal conclusions or unsupported assertions.

OWBPA Claims

The court dismissed Craven’s OWBPA discrimination and retaliation claims. It explained that the OWBPA provisions cited in the opinion protect employees from unknowingly or involuntarily waiving ADEA rights, but do not create an independent claim for age discrimination or retaliation. Craven did not identify a specific OWBPA provision or allege that he was pressured or forced to waive ADEA rights.

Age Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment Claims

The court held that Craven’s ADEA age-discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims were time-barred. An ADEA plaintiff generally must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act. Because Craven filed his EEOC charge on May 7, 2020, acts occurring before July 12, 2019 were outside the relevant period.

Craven argued that the repeated conduct was part of a continuing violation, which can sometimes make older conduct relevant when a related discriminatory act occurred within the filing period. The court rejected that argument because Craven did not allege a qualifying discriminatory act during the 300-day period before his EEOC charge. The court also concluded that later conduct could not be treated as reasonably related to a timely underlying discrimination claim because the discrimination allegations in the EEOC charge were themselves time-barred.

The court’s conclusion states that the motion to dismiss these ADEA and OWBPA discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims was granted with prejudice because the claims were time-barred.

Retaliation for Filing the EEOC Charge

The court determined that Craven’s retaliation claim based on filing the EEOC charge was not time-barred. Retaliation for filing an EEOC charge is generally considered reasonably related to the charge, so a separate EEOC charge is ordinarily unnecessary for that later retaliation claim.

The court nevertheless concluded that Craven did not adequately plead retaliation. He alleged that he was transferred to the Police Academy in Queens, denied an office he expected to receive, subjected to a “THE BOSS” note on a colleague’s computer, and later had his office moved. But he did not allege facts showing that the defendants knew about the EEOC charge when the transfer occurred or facts supporting a causal connection. The court also concluded that the alleged transfer, office assignments, note, and office move were not adequately alleged to have caused a materially significant disadvantage in his working conditions.

Retaliation for Filing the Lawsuit

The court treated filing the lawsuit as protected activity and treated the initiation of termination proceedings as a potentially adverse employment action. However, Craven alleged that the termination proceedings began about four and a half months after the defendants became aware of the lawsuit through service of process. Because he offered no other factual support for retaliatory intent, the court held that this gap was too long, standing alone, to plausibly show causation.

The court therefore concluded that Craven had not adequately pleaded a retaliation claim based on filing the lawsuit. The conclusion states that his retaliation claims were dismissed without prejudice.

State and City Claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over related state-law claims, over Craven’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Those claims were dismissed without prejudice to repleading in state court.

Disposition

Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADEA and OWBPA discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims with prejudice because they were time-barred. The retaliation claims and the state and city law claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court permitted Craven to file a second amended complaint complying with the opinion by August 25, 2022; if he did not, the case would be closed.