Norman v. City of New York

Background

Pro se plaintiff Shomari E. Norman sued the City of New York, New York Police Department Commissioner Dermot Shea, and Leith Chrysler Jeep. He alleged that his Jeep was wrongfully seized on March 5, 2018, and that the repossession damaged his credit. His claims included a constitutional property-deprivation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various federal statutory claims, and state-law tort claims. The City and Commissioner Shea moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that no genuine factual dispute requires a trial. Norman filed several motions opposing that request and seeking other relief.

The record showed that Norman called 911 after observing his Jeep being towed. A tow-truck driver also called 911, and several New York Police Department officers arrived. After speaking with the driver, the officers ordered Norman to release the vehicle, and Norman complied. The Jeep was taken to North Carolina and received by Leith Chrysler Jeep. The court stated that it was not entirely clear whether the towing was initiated by the City, the dealership, or another third party. The New York Police Department had no police report or database records concerning the towing.

Claims Against the City and Commissioner Shea

The court treated Norman’s constitutional property claim as a claim under § 1983. It found that Norman had a property interest in the vehicle and that officers’ alleged involvement was enough to identify a state actor. But the court concluded that Norman had not shown that the towing resulted from an established governmental policy or procedure. Instead, the alleged conduct was treated as a random, unauthorized act by public employees.

For that type of alleged deprivation, the court held that due process is satisfied when an adequate state-law remedy is available after the deprivation. The court found that Norman could have brought state-court claims such as negligence or conversion concerning the vehicle, but he did not do so. It therefore held that he could not establish a constitutional due-process violation and granted summary judgment to the City defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claim.

The court also held, as an alternative ground, that Norman had not shown Commissioner Shea’s personal involvement. Norman testified that Shea was not one of the officers at the scene, and the record did not show that Shea knew about the towing. The court explained that § 1983 liability cannot be based only on a supervisor’s position or general responsibility for an agency’s activities. It granted summary judgment to Shea on the constitutional claim for this additional reason.

Federal Statutory Claims

Norman cited multiple federal statutes in connection with the towing, an alleged failure to appear at a hearing, and alleged false reports to an insurance company. The court held that many of the cited provisions were criminal statutes. Because a private plaintiff cannot use those statutes to require the prosecution of another person or entity, the court concluded that those claims failed as a matter of law.

The court also held that 41 U.S.C. § 4712 and 5 U.S.C. § 2302 concern federal employees, federal agencies, or federal contractors, and Norman did not allege that he was employed by a federal entity or that the dispute involved such employment. It held that 33 C.F.R. § 104.265 concerns security measures for maritime vessels and did not apply to this case. Summary judgment was therefore granted to the City defendants, dismissing each of Norman’s federal statutory claims.

State-Law Tort Claims

Norman asserted state-law claims including slander, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that New York law requires a plaintiff bringing tort claims against a municipal entity or employees acting within the scope of employment to file a notice of claim within 90 days of the incident and begin the lawsuit within the statutory period.

The towing occurred on March 5, 2018, but Norman filed his notice of claim on June 9, 2020. The City rejected it as untimely. The court held that the notice was filed well outside the 90-day period and that the 2020 shutdown cited by Norman did not explain the delay because the towing occurred in 2018. It concluded that the untimely notice deprived the court of jurisdiction over the state-law tort claims and awarded summary judgment to the City defendants on those claims.

Claims Against Leith Chrysler Jeep

The court had previously warned Norman that his claims against Leith Chrysler Jeep could be dismissed if he did not pursue them. The court identified possible steps, including seeking information from the dealership through discovery or seeking a default judgment. Norman continued filing papers but did not provide additional factual information, conduct discovery concerning the dealership, or request a default judgment.

The court found that Norman had failed to prosecute those claims. It considered the duration of the failure, the warning he received, potential prejudice, judicial efficiency, and whether a less severe sanction was appropriate. Although the first two factors supported dismissal, the court found little risk of prejudice, minimal effect on the court’s docket, and that a lesser sanction was appropriate in light of Norman’s pro se status. It therefore dismissed the claims against Leith Chrysler Jeep without prejudice for failure to prosecute.

Disposition

The court granted in its entirety the City defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed all of Norman’s claims against the City of New York and Commissioner Shea with prejudice. It dismissed Norman’s claims against Leith Chrysler Jeep without prejudice for failure to prosecute, directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case, and ordered the City defendants to mail Norman copies of unpublished cases cited in the order if they had not already done so.