Wilkins v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC

Background

Craig Wilkins sued Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS), alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Wilkins had two mortgage loans secured by property at 85-21 213th Street, Hollis, New York. He defaulted in 2007 or 2008. Deutsche Bank filed a foreclosure action in 2010 and voluntarily discontinued it in 2012. SLS began servicing the loans in 2017 and called Wilkins about the unpaid loans approximately 80 times between 2017 and 2020.

Both parties moved for summary judgment, a procedure that allows judgment without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Wilkins did not file a separate opposition to SLS’s motion, but the court treated his own summary-judgment papers as opposing it.

FCRA Claim

Wilkins claimed that SLS unlawfully obtained his credit report for an impermissible purpose. The court held that he presented no admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that SLS had obtained the report. The telephone transcripts did not support that inference, his affidavit did not show personal knowledge of the alleged retrieval, and the credit report he submitted identified Jet Direct Funding Corp. rather than SLS. SLS also submitted an affidavit stating that it had not pulled any credit reports on Wilkins after assuming service of the loans.

The court therefore granted summary judgment to SLS on the FCRA claim. Because Wilkins failed to show that SLS obtained his credit report, the court did not need to decide whether SLS would have had a permissible purpose for obtaining it.

FDCPA Claims

Wilkins asserted three FDCPA theories: that SLS made false or misleading statements about the enforceability of the Second Mortgage and its ability to foreclose; that SLS called him repeatedly with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass him; and that SLS called him at his place of employment in violation of the statute.

For the false-representation claim, Wilkins argued that the debt had been accelerated by the 2010 foreclosure action and that the six-year limitations period had expired. The court applied the New York Court of Appeals’ rule that voluntarily withdrawing a foreclosure action revokes the acceleration unless the noteholder contemporaneously states otherwise. Because Deutsche Bank voluntarily discontinued the foreclosure action in 2012 and Wilkins identified no contrary statement, the Second Mortgage returned to its pre-acceleration status. A new limitations period began with each missed installment, so the mortgage remained enforceable when SLS made the calls. The court held that SLS’s communications were not misleading and granted SLS summary judgment on the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

For the harassment claim, the court found that approximately 80 calls over several years—generally a little more than two calls per month and no more than about one call per week during the period of increased frequency—did not support an inference that SLS intended to annoy, abuse, or harass Wilkins. The court granted SLS summary judgment on the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5).

For the workplace-call claim, the court found that Wilkins did not show that the call was made to a workplace telephone number, that he was at his workplace when the call occurred, or that SLS knew or had reason to know that his employer prohibited debt-collection calls. His statement that he was “working” did not establish such a prohibition. The court therefore granted SLS summary judgment on the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(3). The court did not decide SLS’s statute-of-limitations argument concerning this claim.

Disposition

Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein granted SLS’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims alleged in the complaint and denied Wilkins’s motion for summary judgment. The court requested that the Clerk enter judgment for SLS and close the case.