Kane v. de Blasio

Background

The opinion addressed two consolidated actions challenging New York City’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement for Department of Education staff and others working in person in school settings. The September 15, 2021 version of the mandate required covered workers to provide proof of vaccination. The plaintiffs, who were teachers, administrators, and other Department of Education employees, alleged that they refused vaccination because of their religious beliefs and that the mandate violated federal and state law.

The City and the Board of Education established procedures for employees to seek religious accommodations. After the Second Circuit ordered fresh consideration of the plaintiffs’ requests by a central citywide panel applying standards including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the panel reviewed the named plaintiffs’ requests. The panel granted accommodations for Castro and Ruiz-Toro that allowed them to work remotely but barred them from entering Department of Education school buildings. Most other requests were denied, generally because allowing unvaccinated classroom teachers to work in person would impose an undue hardship by creating risks for students.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The plaintiffs also filed their fourth motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to block enforcement of the mandate and obtain reinstatement of pay and benefits while the case continued.

Federal claims

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Clause challenge. It relied on the Second Circuit’s earlier conclusion that the mandate was neutral and generally applicable, and independently reached the same conclusion. The court found no evidence that the mandate was adopted to target religious groups. Instead, the mandate identified goals of reducing COVID-19 transmission, protecting public health, and allowing schools to operate safely. Because the mandate was neutral and generally applicable, the court applied rational-basis review rather than strict scrutiny and found a sufficient public-health justification.

The court also rejected the Establishment Clause and equal-protection claims. It characterized the Establishment Clause theory as a repackaging of the free-exercise theory and found that the plaintiffs had not identified similarly situated people who were treated differently for equal-protection purposes.

The substantive due-process claim failed because the plaintiffs had no fundamental constitutional right to work in person with children in New York City public schools, and the vaccination requirement was reasonably related to a legitimate public-health objective. The procedural due-process claim also failed. The court found that the plaintiffs received notice, opportunities to submit materials, written decisions, and access to additional challenges through collective-bargaining procedures or a state court proceeding. The court further noted that some plaintiffs did not use the available accommodation process and that Solon’s claims appeared moot after she chose to be vaccinated.

The court concluded that the Citywide Panel’s decisions satisfied Title VII’s requirement to provide a reasonable religious accommodation unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. The court held that allowing unvaccinated classroom teachers to work in person presented more than a minimal cost to the employer. It also held that employees who had already received reasonable accommodations were not entitled to the particular accommodations they preferred.

State-law claims and preliminary injunction

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims; the court stated that it would not address the merits of those claims. The court separately dismissed the Section 1983 claim because Section 1983 provides a vehicle for enforcing other federal rights rather than creating an independent substantive right.

The court denied the preliminary injunction. It found that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and that the alleged economic harm could be remedied with money damages. It also found that the public interest favored vaccination policies supporting the safe reopening of schools.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the open motions and close the case.