Murray v. AET Inc. Ltd

Background

Erin F. Murray sued as executrix and personal representative of the estate of Captain Timothy M. Murray. The opinion states that Captain Murray, a professional sea pilot, died after falling from a pilot ladder on the MV Eagle Turin on August 5, 2020. The parties stipulated, and the court judicially noticed, that the accident occurred approximately seven nautical miles from the shore of New York.

The amended complaint asserted four causes of action. The first and second included wrongful-death and survival claims under general maritime law and New York law, based on alleged unseaworthiness and negligence. The third asserted an alternative wrongful-death claim under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). The fourth asserted an in-rem claim against the MV Eagle Turin for wrongful death and survival, also based on alleged negligence and unseaworthiness. The complaint also demanded a jury trial.

AET Inc. Ltd. and the MV Eagle Turin moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to strike the jury demand, and to obtain costs and fees.

DOHSA’s geographic reach

The court concluded that DOHSA applies to the accident. DOHSA authorizes a civil action in admiralty when a death is caused by wrongful conduct occurring on the high seas beyond three nautical miles from the United States shore. The court determined that the statute, as amended in 2000 and 2006, begins to apply at three nautical miles.

The court discussed the Second Circuit’s decision in the earlier related proceeding involving the TWA Flight 800 crash. That decision had interpreted DOHSA as not applying within the United States’ 12-nautical-mile territorial sea after a 1988 presidential proclamation. The court concluded that the later amendments to DOHSA made that interpretation nonbinding for this case. In the court’s view, the amended statutory text, including provisions referring to commercial aviation accidents within and beyond 12 nautical miles, could not be read consistently with a rule that placed the beginning of DOHSA at 12 nautical miles.

The court also rejected the argument that New York’s territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles. It relied on the federal Submerged Lands Act, federal case law, Second Circuit case law, and New York case law in concluding that New York’s boundary extends three nautical miles from shore. Because the accident occurred approximately seven nautical miles from shore, the court held that DOHSA applied.

Effect on other claims

The court held that, where DOHSA applies, it preempts wrongful-death claims under general maritime law and state law. The court also held that DOHSA preempts the general-maritime survival claims and concluded that the state-law survival claims were unavailable as well. The court further concluded that DOHSA does not permit recovery beyond the damages authorized by the statute, including the asserted survival damages for pre-death pain and suffering.

As a result, the court determined that the surviving claims could proceed only under DOHSA. The opinion’s conclusion states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part; it does not separately list a disposition for each individual count in the concluding paragraph.

Pleading of the DOHSA claim

The court found that the amended complaint did not plead enough facts to support the DOHSA claim. Although the complaint described the accident as occurring in New York’s territorial waters and on navigable waters, it did not state the distance from shore or otherwise plead facts from which DOHSA coverage could reasonably be inferred. The court therefore found the DOHSA allegations insufficient under the pleading standards requiring factual allegations that make relief plausible.

The court nevertheless allowed Murray to file a second amended complaint properly pleading the DOHSA claim. The permission to amend came from the parties’ stipulation, which the court had previously ordered.

In-rem claim

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the in-rem claim had to be dismissed merely because it was not separately designated under Rule 9(h). An in-rem action against a vessel is an admiralty claim, and the court stated that a Rule 9(h) designation was unnecessary because the claim could be brought only under admiralty jurisdiction.

The court also held that the Letter of Undertaking could serve as substitute security for the vessel. The Letter of Undertaking stated that the vessel and its owners consented to in-personam and in-rem jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York and provided up to $19,900,000 in security for a final judgment.

However, because DOHSA applied, the in-rem claim could proceed only to the extent it asserted a DOHSA cause of action. The court found that the in-rem claim was improperly pleaded to the extent it sought general maritime-law or state-law remedies, because those remedies were preempted. The court allowed Murray to file a second amended complaint properly pleading the in-rem claim under DOHSA.

Jury demand and disposition

The court held that DOHSA provides an admiralty remedy and does not create a right to a jury trial. Because the general maritime-law and state-law claims were preempted and no other jury-triable claims remained, the court granted the motion to strike Murray’s jury demand.

The court’s final dispositions were: the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted in part and denied in part; the motion to strike the jury demand was granted; and the request for costs and fees was denied. If Murray chose to amend, the second amended complaint was due within 30 days of the opinion and order.