Tavarez v. Moo Organic Chocolates, LLC

Background

Victoriano Tavarez, who is legally blind and uses screen-reading software, sued Moo Organic Chocolates, LLC, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and city law. He alleged that, during unspecified visits between June 27, 2021, and June 2022, he browsed and attempted to transact business on Moo’s website, which he alleged was the sole way to transact business with the company. He identified accessibility problems including screen-reading software that failed to read pop-up links and failed to describe images of selected products.

Moo moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Moo argued that its standalone website was not a “place of public accommodation” under Title III because it was not connected to a physical, brick-and-mortar location.

ADA Website Issue

The court held that Title III applies to public-facing websites regardless of whether they are connected to a physical location. The court found the statutory language ambiguous because the ADA does not specifically mention websites and was enacted in 1990, before websites became widespread. It nevertheless concluded that the statute’s reference to services, including travel services, its broad purpose of eliminating disability discrimination, and its legislative history supported covering services provided through websites.

The court therefore found that Moo’s website falls within the ADA’s definition of a place of public accommodation. Because Tavarez stated an ADA claim, the court concluded that his city-law claim was within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Standing

Although Moo did not challenge standing, the court considered it because standing is a threshold requirement for federal jurisdiction. For an ADA claim seeking injunctive relief, the court explained that a plaintiff must plausibly allege past discrimination, a reasonable likelihood that the discrimination will continue, and a real and immediate threat that the plaintiff intends to return to the location or website.

The court found that Tavarez’s amended complaint did not provide enough facts to support an inference that he intended to return to Moo’s website. Although he alleged that he had browsed the website and still wanted to purchase chocolate after the barriers were removed, he did not state how often he visited, when each visit occurred, that he had a particular interest in buying chocolate from Moo, or other facts supporting an intent to return. The court therefore said he likely had not established standing.

Other Rulings and Disposition

The court denied Moo’s request to certify the decision for interlocutory appeal. Moo raised that request for the first time in its reply brief, and the court declined to consider the new request on that basis.

Judge Valerie Caproni denied Moo’s motion to dismiss. The court ordered Tavarez, by September 9, 2022, either to seek permission to file a second amended complaint adequately alleging standing or to show cause why the amended complaint should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Moo’s response was due September 23, 2022, and Tavarez’s reply was due September 30, 2022.