Brown v. Annucci

Background

Byron K. Brown, representing himself and without paying the filing fee, sued correctional employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted state-law assault and battery claims. He alleged that correctional officers used excessive force against him during an April 6, 2019 altercation at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. He also alleged that officials later covered up the incident, that his disciplinary hearing violated due process, and that officials discriminated against him because he is Black.

The pending motion was defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Sergeant F. Caraballo, Correction Officers J. Ayala, S. Amaro, and Carlos J. Rodriguez had not moved for summary judgment on Brown’s excessive-force or state-law assault and battery claims. The opinion states that factual disputes about the altercation itself concern the excessive-force claim that will go to trial.

Summary-judgment standard

The court explained that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but unsupported or merely conclusory assertions are insufficient.

Conspiracy claim

The defendants argued that Brown had not exhausted the prison grievance process for his conspiracy claim and, separately, that the evidence did not show an agreement to violate his constitutional rights.

The court rejected the exhaustion argument. Brown’s April 17, 2019 grievance said that Sergeant Caraballo had filed false reports to mislead prison officials and cover up the assault. The court held that this provided enough information to alert prison officials to the alleged cover-up conspiracy, even though Brown did not use the word “conspiracy.”

The court nevertheless dismissed the conspiracy claim on the merits. It explained that a § 1983 conspiracy requires an agreement, coordinated conduct intended to cause an unconstitutional injury, and an act furthering that plan that caused damages. Even assuming a jury could find that officials agreed to cover up the alleged excessive force, Brown did not present evidence that the alleged conspiracy caused an independent constitutional injury, such as denial of access to the courts or deprivation of due process. The court stated that there is no constitutional right to be free from a cover-up of a past constitutional violation.

Due-process claim against Deputy Superintendent Malin

Brown alleged that Deputy Superintendent Lesley F. Malin violated due process by refusing to call eight requested witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. The court held that Malin had a rational basis for not calling them: the witnesses reportedly said they had not observed the incident, could not remember it, or could not remember Brown. Malin and the legal assistant assigned to Brown’s disciplinary proceeding had communicated with the witnesses, and six witnesses signed written refusal forms.

The court found that the timing discrepancy between Malin’s report of the refusals and the dates on several written forms was only a small amount of evidence and did not create a genuine factual dispute. It also found that the absence of written refusal forms from two witnesses did not establish a constitutional violation, particularly because there was no indication that those witnesses would have testified or offered favorable testimony. The court dismissed the due-process claim against Malin.

Equal-protection claim

Brown alleged that Sergeant Caraballo and Correction Officers Ayala, Amaro, and Rodriguez treated him differently because of his race. The court held that Brown’s evidence—that he is Black and the alleged attackers are Hispanic—was not enough by itself to support a finding of intentional racial discrimination. He offered no additional evidence, such as racially biased comments or a pattern of different treatment based on race. The court dismissed the equal-protection claim.

Claims against Correction Officer Merejo

Brown claimed that Correction Officer Lervis Merejo opened his cell door remotely, enabling the other officers to enter and attack him. The court dismissed all claims against Merejo because Brown testified that he had never seen Merejo before and presented no evidence showing Merejo’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation.

The court added that, even if Merejo was the officer who opened the cell door, Brown offered no evidence that Merejo knew an assault would follow or had an opportunity to intervene.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. It dismissed the conspiracy, due-process, and equal-protection claims, and dismissed all claims against Merejo. The opinion states that Brown’s excessive-force claim against other defendants will proceed toward trial; the motion did not seek summary judgment on the excessive-force or state-law assault and battery claims against Caraballo, Ayala, Amaro, and Rodriguez.

The court also denied Brown permission to pursue an appeal without paying the required fees, certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The clerk was instructed to terminate J. Deckelbaum, Lervis Merejo, and L. Malin from the action and to terminate the motion.