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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 8, 2022

Nimham-El-Dey v. Childrens Aid Society

Judge
Lorna Schofield
Docket
1:21-cv-08237
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
8
Motion to DismissCivil RightsSection 1983Pro Se
In one sentence

In Nimham-El-Dey v. Childrens Aid Society, Judge Schofield dismissed claims arising from alleged childhood abuse as untimely or legally unavailable.

Who this affects

The dismissal ended Abdullah Spencer Nimham-El-Dey’s federal and state-law claims against Children’s Aid Society, the City of New York, and Eddie Butler. The order also denied permission to proceed without paying filing fees for an appeal.

What happened

In Nimham-El-Dey v. Childrens Aid Society, Abdullah Spencer Nimham-El-Dey sued Children’s Aid Society, the City of New York, and Eddie Butler over alleged sexual abuse by Butler, who the complaint says was his foster parent. The alleged abuse occurred in 1985, when Nimham-El-Dey was eleven. Nimham-El-Dey represented himself.

The court treated the complaint as raising constitutional, federal statutory, and state-law claims. It ruled that the civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal sex-trafficking and child-abuse claims were filed too late. It also ruled that several other federal claims were legally unavailable or inadequately pleaded, including claims under the Treaty Clause, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Convention Against Torture, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

The court dismissed the case, including the claims against Butler, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Judge Lorna G. Schofield also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying filing fees for an appeal.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Nimham-El-Dey v. Childrens Aid Society · No. 1:21-cv-08237
Judge
Lorna Schofield
Date
Sept. 8, 2022

Background

Abdullah Spencer Nimham-El-Dey, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Children’s Aid Society, the City of New York, and Eddie Butler. The complaint alleged that Butler was Nimham-El-Dey’s foster parent and sexually abused him when he was eleven years old in 1985. It further alleged that the City Defendants placed Nimham-El-Dey in Butler’s care even though Butler was a known “child molester” and failed to act after learning of the alleged abuse.

The City Defendants moved to dismiss. Because Nimham-El-Dey was representing himself, the court treated allegations in his January 31, 2022, letter and his opposition to the motion as part of the complaint. Butler had not been served and did not move to dismiss. The court nevertheless addressed the claims against him and stated that those claims were either time barred or not actionable.

Claims the Court Found Time Barred

The court construed the complaint as asserting a deliberate-indifference claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a claim against the City Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. It held that the § 1983 claim was barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations because the alleged conduct occurred in 1985 and the action was filed in 2021.

The court also construed the complaint as asserting federal claims under the sex-trafficking statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1595, and a child-abuse claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. It held that both types of claims were time barred because more than ten years had passed after Nimham-El-Dey turned eighteen in or around 1992. The court further held that New York’s Child Victims Act, which revives or extends certain state-law sexual-abuse claims, did not extend the federal limitations periods applicable to these claims.

Remaining Federal Claims

The court construed the complaint as also asserting claims under the Treaty Clause, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Convention Against Torture, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

The court held that the Treaty Clause did not apply because it concerns states entering into treaties and similar governmental arrangements. It held that the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Convention Against Torture, and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act did not provide a private right of action, meaning that individuals could not sue under those provisions for the relief sought. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute that private citizens cannot enforce through a civil lawsuit.

The court also held that the complaint did not sufficiently allege discrimination based on race, color, or national origin under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The court found that Nimham-El-Dey’s allegations and opposition did not provide facts supporting an inference of the required discriminatory intent.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court also rejected Nimham-El-Dey’s argument that 4 U.S.C. § 105 and related provisions supplied jurisdiction over those claims.

The order states that the case was dismissed and directs the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket 42 and the case. The court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying filing fees for purposes of an appeal. Judge Lorna G. Schofield signed the order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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