Craig Moss v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Craig Moss brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asking the court to review the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision on his application for Supplemental Security Income. Moss alleged disability beginning April 14, 2016. An administrative law judge found that he was not disabled, but the Appeals Council later found him disabled beginning July 30, 2019, when his age category changed. The remaining dispute concerned whether he was disabled before that date.

The administrative law judge found severe impairments including degenerative disc disease, asthma, obesity, depression, and anxiety. She determined that Moss had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do in a work setting—to perform light work with restrictions, including limited climbing, reaching, and interaction with others; avoidance of respiratory irritants; and simple, routine, low-stress work. Based on vocational-expert testimony, she found that Moss could perform jobs such as marker, mail clerk, and router.

Moss’s Arguments

Moss argued that the administrative law judge should have limited him to sedentary work rather than light work. He also argued that the judge improperly evaluated the opinion of physician assistant Justin Boyd, gave too much weight to the one-time consultative examination by Dr. Carol McLean Long, failed to account for absences from work, failed to properly address his mental limitations, and improperly evaluated his statements about pain and other symptoms. Moss further argued that the judge should have obtained an updated consultative examination because Dr. McLean Long examined him about three years before the administrative decision.

Court’s Analysis

The court found no obvious gaps in the administrative record and concluded that the administrative law judge fulfilled her duty to develop it. The court also upheld the judge’s treatment of the medical opinions. Because Boyd was a physician assistant and therefore was not an acceptable medical source for purposes of the applicable regulations, his opinion was not entitled to controlling weight under the treating-physician rule. The court nevertheless found that the judge properly considered his opinion and reasonably assigned it little weight because it was more restrictive than other evidence. The court also held that a one-time consultative opinion may receive great weight when supported by the record.

The court rejected Moss’s argument that McLean Long’s opinion was stale. Although Moss reported worsening pain, the later medical records did not show a significant development causing new disabling functional limitations. The court also rejected the argument concerning absences. Boyd’s statement that Moss would miss more than three workdays each month appeared on a check-box form without supporting explanation, and other evidence did not support that specific restriction.

The court found, however, that the residual-functional-capacity assessment did not address Moss’s ability to sit and stand or his need to alternate between those positions. Evidence included Moss’s report that he could sit or stand for only fifteen minutes at a time during physical therapy, his testimony that he could sit for twenty to thirty minutes before his back became numb, Boyd’s assessment that he needed to recline or rest, and McLean Long’s assessment of mild-to-moderate sitting and standing limitations. The administrative law judge gave McLean Long’s opinion great weight but did not explain why the residual functional capacity omitted these limitations.

The court also found that the administrative law judge improperly discounted Moss’s statements about his symptoms. The judge relied on Moss’s activities while caring for his seriously ill mother but did not adequately discuss the period after his mother died, when his activities changed and his pain continued or worsened. The judge also characterized Moss’s treatment as conservative even though the record showed repeated epidural, trigger-point, and medial-branch injections, as well as several pain medications. Finally, the judge selectively cited medical evidence, including by stating that examinations showed 5/5 strength while repeated records documented 4/5 strength and by overlooking evidence that sitting, standing, and walking aggravated Moss’s pain.

The court rejected Moss’s arguments concerning his mental limitations. It held that the administrative law judge could find moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace at an earlier stage of the disability analysis while concluding that simple, routine, low-stress work adequately addressed those limitations in the residual-functional-capacity assessment.

Disposition

The court granted Moss’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, the administrative law judge must reconsider Moss’s ability to sit and stand, reassess his residual functional capacity, and reevaluate his vocational ability. The court did not decide that Moss was entitled to benefits for the disputed period.