Brown v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Mary Hurd Brown, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York City Department of Education. Her claims arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The opinion states that Brown’s initial complaint also named Eric Friedman, but her amended complaint named only the Department of Education.

The Department of Education first moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted that motion and allowed Brown to amend, while identifying additional facts she needed to provide. Brown then filed a second amended complaint, and the Department of Education again moved to dismiss. Brown later filed a response requesting summary judgment.

Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Wang recommended granting the motion to dismiss except as to Brown’s failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act concerning her use of a personal car to make home visits. Brown objected to the recommendation. The district court reviewed the unobjected-to portions for clear error and reviewed the specific objection concerning her early-hours and workspace accommodations independently.

Court’s Analysis

The court found no clear error in Judge Wang’s conclusions that Brown had not alleged enough facts to support disability discrimination or an adverse employment action based on disability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. The court also agreed that Brown’s workplace-harassment allegations were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile-work-environment claim and that she had not adequately alleged retaliation for protected activity.

The court separately considered Brown’s allegation that the Department of Education revoked and later restored her early-hours and workspace accommodations. Brown alleged that she had received those accommodations beginning in 1993, requested them again after their revocation in December 2018, and did not receive them again until September or October 2019. The court explained that a long delay can potentially amount to a constructive denial of a reasonable accommodation, even when the accommodation is eventually provided. But Brown also needed to allege facts supporting an inference that the delay was caused by discriminatory intent. Because she did not do so, the court held that the claim failed under both the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

Disposition

The court adopted Judge Wang’s report and recommendation, with slightly different reasoning in connection with the early-hours and workspace accommodations. It granted in part and denied in part the Department of Education’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Brown’s New York State and New York City Human Rights Law claims, her Americans with Disabilities Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims based on discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring before May 23, 2018, and her accommodation claim concerning the early-hours and workspace accommodations. The court denied the motion to dismiss Brown’s failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act based on her use of a personal car.

The court did not grant Brown permission to amend again, explaining that she had already been told what facts were missing and had not cured the deficiencies in her second amended complaint. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the open motions and mail the order to Brown.