Bayne v. Target Corporation

Background

Mieke Bayne and Alyssa Hart filed a proposed class action against Target Corporation concerning Target’s Heyday Charging Cable, a charger for iPhones and iPads. They alleged that the chargers used inferior materials and had latent manufacturing defects that caused them to break, overheat, or stop working shortly after purchase. The amended complaint asserted six causes of action: breach of implied warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, violations of New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, fraudulent omission, and unjust enrichment.

Bayne alleged that her charger became too hot to use about a week after purchase. Hart alleged that her charger broke at the tip about a week after purchase. The plaintiffs also alleged that Target’s website contained negative reviews and that reports about the product had been filed with the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Target moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court treated the amended complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.

Rulings on the Claims

Implied warranty. The court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded a breach of New York’s implied warranty of merchantability. The court rejected Target’s argument that the claim failed because the plaintiffs had not given notice before filing suit. Relying on New York appellate authority, the court concluded that a complaint and a later amended complaint can themselves provide notice, leaving the question of whether the notice was timely for the factfinder. The court also rejected Target’s argument that the plaintiffs had to show Target knew about the defects. According to the court, knowledge of the defect is not an element of an implied-warranty claim. This claim was not dismissed.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The court dismissed the federal warranty claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The statute requires, among other things, at least 100 named plaintiffs when the claim is brought as a class action in federal district court. The plaintiffs did not dispute that their proposed class action had fewer than 100 named plaintiffs. The court held that the Class Action Fairness Act could not be used to bypass the Magnuson-Moss Act’s separate numerosity requirement.

New York consumer-protection claims. The court dismissed the claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350. Those claims were based on an alleged omission: Target allegedly failed to disclose the chargers’ defects. The court held that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that the relevant information was unavailable to them, because the negative reviews on Target’s website and the consumer-safety reports were publicly available.

Fraudulent omission. The court dismissed this claim. The plaintiffs did not allege that Target owed them a fiduciary duty, and the court found that they had not adequately alleged that Target possessed information that was not readily available to the plaintiffs.

Unjust enrichment. The court granted Target’s motion as to this claim because the plaintiffs did not explain how it differed from their other claims, which sought the same relief based on the same conduct.

Class-action standing. The court rejected Target’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a class action. Because the plaintiffs plausibly stated an implied-warranty claim against Target, they had standing to pursue that claim on behalf of the proposed class.

Disposition and Jurisdiction

The court granted in part and denied in part Target’s motion to dismiss. The motion was granted in all respects except as to the breach-of-implied-warranty claim. The opinion does not state that the dismissed claims were dismissed with or without prejudice.

The Magnuson-Moss claim had been the only stated basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The court therefore directed the parties to submit simultaneous letter briefs within 14 days addressing whether the court retained jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act or should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The court also directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion.