Rowe v. Google LLC
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:19-cv-08655
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 18
In Rowe v. Google LLC, Judge Schofield denied both sides’ summary-judgment motions, leaving Rowe’s equal-pay, discrimination, and retaliation claims unresolved.
Ulku Rowe and Google LLC were directly affected. The ruling left factual disputes about equal pay, sex discrimination, and retaliation unresolved rather than deciding them in either party’s favor.
What happened
In Rowe v. Google LLC, Ulku Rowe claimed that Google paid her less than comparable male employees, treated her less favorably because of her sex, and retaliated after she complained. Google denied liability and argued that differences in experience and qualifications explained its decisions.
The court found factual disputes about whether Rowe and male Technical Directors performed substantially equivalent work, whether she was paid less, why Google hired her at a lower level, and whether sex or retaliation influenced her treatment and promotion opportunities. Those disputes meant a jury could reasonably rule for either side.
Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied Google’s motion for summary judgment and denied Rowe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court also denied Google’s motion for oral argument as moot, so the claims addressed in the opinion remained unresolved.
The detailed version
- Rowe v. Google LLC · No. 1:19-cv-08655
- Lorna Schofield
- Sept. 26, 2022
Background
Ulku Rowe sued her current employer, Google LLC, alleging sex-based discrimination and retaliation under the New York Equal Pay Law, sections of the New York Labor Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Rowe had more than twenty years of financial-services experience and began working for Google in March 2017 as a Technical Director. Google hired her at Level 8, while some male Technical Directors were hired at Level 9. Rowe was the only woman serving as a Technical Director when she was hired.
Rowe contended that she performed the same or substantially similar work as higher-paid male employees, including a pseudonymized employee identified in the opinion as “Comparator 1.” She also alleged that, after she moved to a different Google team, her supervisor excluded her from meetings and other work activities, did not select her for a financial-services leadership role, and later refused to consider her for a vice-president position. Rowe argued that these actions were connected to her sex and to complaints she made about unequal treatment and pay.
Google argued that Rowe’s comparators performed different or more complex work and that her lower starting level and pay reflected factors such as cloud experience rather than sex. Google also offered non-retaliatory explanations for the decisions about the leadership positions, including interview feedback, qualifications, and changes affecting the hiring process.
Summary-judgment standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because both sides moved for summary judgment, the court evaluated each motion separately and drew reasonable inferences against the party whose motion it was considering.
Equal-pay claim
The court denied Google’s motion for summary judgment on Rowe’s New York Equal Pay Law claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Comparator 1 and Rowe had the same Technical Director job, worked in the same New York City office, were evaluated using the same criteria, and performed substantially equivalent work. Evidence also supported a possible finding that Rowe received less compensation, including different salary and bonus offers when they were hired.
The court also denied Rowe’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. Google presented evidence that Comparator 1’s role may have had greater scope and complexity, and the parties disputed how to calculate and compare their 2017 compensation. Those factual disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment.
The court separately denied Rowe’s motion for summary judgment on Google’s affirmative defense that a business-related factor other than gender caused the pay difference. Google presented evidence that relative cloud experience and level influenced starting pay, including testimony about the process used to assess candidates and the reasons offered for recommending Rowe as Level 8.
Sex-discrimination claim
The court denied Google’s motion for summary judgment on Rowe’s New York City Human Rights Law discrimination claim. Rowe presented evidence that Google hired her at Level 8, paid her less than similarly situated male employees, and excluded her from meetings, email lists, and strategy discussions after her transfer. Google offered competing explanations, including Rowe’s cloud experience and evidence that some meeting-access problems were corrected. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could still find that sex discrimination played some role in Google’s actions.
Retaliation claims
The court denied summary judgment on the retaliation claims. The opinion states that Google did not dispute that Rowe had made the initial showing needed for the first three parts of a retaliation claim, and the court found sufficient evidence of a possible causal connection between her complaints and later employment decisions. The evidence included the timing of her complaints, the decision not to select her for an interim financial-services leadership role, the removal of responsibilities, and Google’s later refusal to consider her for a vice-president position after she filed the lawsuit.
Google offered non-retaliatory explanations, including interview feedback, a pause in the leadership-role search, and Rowe’s alleged lack of sales-team-management experience. The court nevertheless concluded that a reasonable jury could find a connection between Rowe’s protected complaints and the challenged decisions.
Disposition
Google’s motion for summary judgment was denied. Rowe’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied. Google’s motion for oral argument was denied as moot. The court directed the Clerk of Court to close the motions listed at docket numbers 137 and 152.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.