Cho v. Chu

Background

Young Sook Cho brought claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law against Eun Sook Chu and the estate of Dong Yun Chu, and a civil claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act against the Chus and five entities: DYC Corp., 50 West Eunsook C.K. Corp., 17 Harwood, LLC, Pee Dee Corp., and Pee Dee II Corp.

Cho alleged that she moved from South Korea to the United States in 1999 after the Chus promised to employ her as a live-in domestic worker. She alleged that she worked for them from 1999 through February 2021, often 16 hours per day and more than 112 hours per week. She alleged that the Chus paid her a flat monthly amount from 1999 through 2001 and did not pay her from 2002 through February 2021. She also alleged that Eun Sook Chu kicked, slapped, threatened, and otherwise mistreated her, including when Cho requested unpaid wages.

According to the second amended complaint, the Chus benefited from Cho’s unpaid labor because it allowed them to spend time growing their business, acquiring properties, and operating restaurants. Cho alleged that the five entities were owned by the Chus or associated with them and that the entities benefited from her forced labor.

Motion and recommendation

The five entity defendants moved to dismiss the Trafficking Victims Protection Act claim against them. Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the motion be granted and that the claim against the entities be dismissed. The parties did not object to the recommendation.

Because no objections were filed after the parties were warned that failing to object would waive further judicial review, the court reviewed the recommendation for clear error rather than conducting a new review of the disputed issues.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s financial-beneficiary provision. A plaintiff proceeding under that provision must adequately allege that the defendant: (1) knowingly benefited or received something of value; (2) from participating in a venture; and (3) knew or should have known that the venture had engaged in conduct violating the Act’s forced-labor provision.

The court agreed with Judge Aaron that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the first element. Cho did not allege that she worked for any of the entity defendants. Although she alleged that her labor enabled the Chus to spend time on their businesses and properties, she did not allege facts showing that her unpaid labor caused the entities to receive additional time, money, or another thing of value.

The court also agreed that the complaint did not adequately allege that the entities participated in a venture with the Chus to obtain Cho’s labor. The complaint did not identify any action taken by the entities. The allegations that the Chus owned or were associated with the entities did not, by themselves, establish the entities’ participation, and the remaining allegations were conclusory because they largely repeated the statute’s language.

Ruling

Judge Gardephe adopted Judge Aaron’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The court granted the entity defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act claim against DYC Corp., 50 West Eunsook C.K. Corp., 17 Harwood, LLC, Pee Dee Corp., and Pee Dee II Corp. The Clerk was directed to terminate those entities as defendants and to terminate the motion. The opinion does not state a disposition of Cho’s other claims against the Chus or the estate.