Bernard v. Care Design N.Y.

Background

Luc R. Bernard sued Care Design N.Y. (CDNY) and its CEO, Jim Moran, representing himself. He alleged discrimination based on national origin, sex, race, and age under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. His complaint focused mainly on CDNY’s decision not to promote him to Care Manager Supervisor and the end of his employment. He also asserted claims involving a hostile work environment, defamation, entrapment, unpaid employment benefits, and other workplace complaints.

Bernard alleged that CDNY initially offered him a Senior Care Manager Supervisor position but later offered him a lower-level Care Manager position. After he applied for a supervisor position, three women were selected instead. He alleged that male employees received less support, more difficult cases, and poor evaluations, and that the relevant office had no male supervisors. He later had a dispute with supervisors about his workload, was suspended, and received a termination notice. He filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge concerning the failed promotion, identifying discrimination based on sex, national origin, race, and age, but the charge did not mention his termination or a hostile work environment.

Defendants’ Motion

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), which concerns inadequate service of process, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns failure to state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Bernard had not served Moran, had not completed the required administrative process for some federal discrimination claims, had not adequately alleged discrimination by CDNY, and had not stated his additional claims.

Because Bernard was representing himself, the court read his complaint and consistent statements in his opposition papers broadly. Even so, the court required him to allege enough facts to make his claims legally plausible.

Rulings

The court dismissed the claims against Moran without prejudice under Rule 4(m) because Bernard had not shown that he served Moran with the summons and complaint. Serving a CDNY agent did not establish service on Moran personally, and Bernard did not show that the agent was authorized to accept service for Moran.

The court dismissed Bernard’s federal claims based on his termination and alleged hostile work environment because he had not exhausted those claims through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The charge addressed the failed promotion, not the termination or hostile work environment, and the court found those claims were not reasonably related to the promotion claim. The court also concluded that the termination was not alleged to be retaliation for filing the charge because the events leading to the termination began before Bernard went to the agency. The termination and hostile-work-environment claims were dismissed with prejudice because the applicable time limit had passed. The court separately stated that the hostile-work-environment allegations would also have been insufficient even if exhaustion had been timely.

The court dismissed with prejudice the claims based on national origin, race, and age. Bernard did not allege facts connecting the promotion decision or termination to his Belgian national origin, did not allege facts supporting a racial-discrimination inference, and did not allege that age was the necessary cause of either adverse action. The court also dismissed with prejudice his gender-discrimination claim concerning his termination because the allegations did not connect that decision to his gender.

The court allowed Bernard’s Title VII failure-to-promote claim based on gender discrimination to proceed. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepted his allegations as true and found that the selection of women instead of Bernard, together with his allegations about the treatment of male employees and the lack of male supervisors, provided the minimal inference of gender discrimination required at that stage. The court also found that Bernard had adequately alleged that he was qualified and that the promoted women were comparable applicants.

The court dismissed with prejudice Bernard’s defamation claim because he did not allege that the statement was communicated to a third party, and the statement that he might be too strict was likely an opinion rather than a provably false fact. The court dismissed the entrapment claim with prejudice because entrapment is a defense in a criminal case, not an independent civil claim.

The court dismissed without prejudice Bernard’s claims concerning transportation benefits, health insurance, retirement funds, unused leave, and other alleged losses because he had not identified sufficient facts or a legal basis for payment. The order stated that he could replead those claims by identifying an employment contract or another basis for the benefits.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Bernard’s claims against Moran were dismissed without prejudice. The claims concerning benefits and other allegations discussed in Section IV.D were dismissed without prejudice. The motion was denied as to Bernard’s Title VII failure-to-promote claim. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice. Judge Lewis J. Liman directed the clerk to close the motion.