Alvarado v. United Hospice, Inc.

Background

Elizabeth Alvarado, Ericka Aguilar, Wanda Azu Nieves, and Marie Wood Smith were former United Hospice employees. They alleged that United Hospice and its individual defendants, Cara Danielle Pace and Judith Peacock, discriminated and retaliated against them because of their race or ethnicity and subjected them to a hostile work environment, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law. Nieves additionally alleged that United Hospice failed to reasonably accommodate her disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The plaintiffs described various workplace events, including office moves, criticism, discipline, alleged unequal treatment, pressure concerning in-person patient visits, personal protective equipment, performance reviews, and workplace comments. The opinion noted that the evidentiary record had significant gaps and that the parties provided limited documentary evidence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.

Claims Addressed and Abandoned

The complaint asserted nine causes of action involving discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, aiding and abetting under the New York State Human Rights Law, individual liability under § 1981, and Nieves’s disability-accommodation claim.

In opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiffs pursued only Alvarado’s discrimination claim; the hostile-work-environment claims of all four plaintiffs; the retaliation claims of Alvarado and Wood Smith; and Nieves’s Americans with Disabilities Act accommodation claim. The court found that the plaintiffs had abandoned Aguilar’s, Nieves’s, and Wood Smith’s discrimination claims; Nieves’s Title VII, § 1981, and New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim; and any constructive-discharge claims. The court also treated any separate disability-discrimination claim by Nieves as abandoned because the plaintiffs did not address it.

Court’s Analysis

Alvarado’s discrimination claim. The court held that Alvarado did not show an adverse employment action—a materially harmful change in the terms or conditions of employment—under Title VII, § 1981, or the New York State Human Rights Law. The court relied on the undisputed fact that Alvarado was never demoted and never lost pay or benefits. It concluded that the alleged micromanagement, exclusion from some decisions, lack of support, interference with her responsibilities, discipline, and denial of additional compensation did not materially change her employment. The court also held that, even assuming some alleged conduct could qualify as adverse, Alvarado did not identify a properly comparable employee outside her protected group or otherwise provide evidence supporting a connection between the conduct and discrimination. The motion was granted as to this claim.

Alvarado’s and Wood Smith’s retaliation claims. The court found that both plaintiffs engaged in protected activity of which defendants were aware by making internal complaints about Pace’s treatment of Wood Smith. It held, however, that relocating their offices was not materially adverse retaliation because it would not have dissuaded a reasonable worker from complaining about discrimination. The court treated the disciplinary charges against Alvarado differently: a formal reprimand can qualify as a materially adverse action for retaliation purposes even without an immediate loss of pay or benefits. Nevertheless, the court found that defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the discipline—Alvarado had approved a remote-work arrangement for an employee without obtaining the required approval—and that plaintiffs offered no evidence that this reason was a pretext, meaning a cover for retaliation. The motion was granted as to both retaliation claims.

Hostile work environment claims. The court granted summary judgment on the hostile-work-environment claims of Alvarado, Aguilar, Nieves, and Wood Smith. It found that the alleged mistreatment was not supported by evidence showing that it occurred because of race or ethnicity. For Alvarado, the alleged micromanagement, exclusion, undermining, discipline, and compensation dispute were facially race-neutral and unsupported by evidence of discriminatory intent. For Aguilar and Nieves, the court reached the same conclusion regarding pressure to make patient visits, a mask-related reprimand, shared protective equipment, and Aguilar’s assignment involving a patient’s family member. For Wood Smith, the court found no evidence connecting the alleged disrespectful treatment or performance reviews to her race. The court also concluded that Nieves’s isolated “missed the boat” comment was not actionable.

Claims against Pace and Peacock. The court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ individual New York State Human Rights Law and § 1981 claims against Pace and Peacock. Under the New York law aiding-and-abetting theory, there had to be an underlying violation by United Hospice, and the court had found no such violation. For § 1981, the court found no discriminatory action in which Pace or Peacock could have been personally involved.

Nieves’s disability-accommodation claim. The court granted summary judgment on Nieves’s Americans with Disabilities Act claim. The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Nieves had a qualifying disability, that United Hospice knew about it, and that she could perform her essential job duties with a reasonable accommodation. The court found that United Hospice provided a plainly reasonable accommodation: for six weeks, Nieves was excused from visits to nursing or adult homes and from visits to patient homes where an actively infectious COVID-19 case was known, while continuing to serve patients at the Joe Raso Hospice Residence who were not infected or were no longer infectious. The court held that the temporary six-week limit was not unreasonable because United Hospice explained that it could not bill for remote services and left open the possibility of extending the arrangement.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion, enter judgment for United Hospice, Pace, and Peacock, and close the case.