Dillon v. Rosen

Background

Chauncey Dillon, who was incarcerated and proceeding without a lawyer, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims for violations of federal rights by persons acting under state law. He sued Harvey Rosen, an Assistant District Attorney; Bonnie Wittner, an Acting Justice of the New York Supreme Court, New York County; James McQueeney, his criminal defense attorney; and Mark J. Murphy, a New York City Police Detective.

Dillon’s allegations arose from his arrest or confinement, the bringing of criminal charges, Murphy’s testimony, Wittner’s actions while presiding over his criminal case, Rosen’s prosecution of him, and McQueeney’s representation of him. The opinion states that Dillon was convicted after the state-court criminal case and that the conviction survived appeal. He sought damages and asked the federal court to require the defendants to stand trial and respond to alleged civil-rights violations.

Legal standard

Because Dillon was incarcerated, the court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek money from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning legal authority to hear them. Although courts read self-represented complaints liberally, the complaint still had to provide enough facts to state a plausible claim.

Claims against Acting Justice Wittner

The court dismissed Dillon’s claims for damages and injunctive relief against Wittner under judicial immunity. Judges are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for actions taken as part of their judicial responsibilities, even when a plaintiff alleges bad faith or malice. Dillon’s allegations concerned Wittner’s actions and decisions while presiding over his state-court criminal case, and the court found that neither recognized exception to judicial immunity applied.

The court also explained that Section 1983 generally does not allow injunctive relief against a judge unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. The opinion states that declaratory relief was available through an appeal of Wittner’s decisions.

Claims against Assistant District Attorney Rosen

The court dismissed Dillon’s damages claims against Rosen under prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages claims for actions within their official duties that are closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. Because Dillon’s claims arose from Rosen’s prosecution of him in state court, the court dismissed them as seeking money from an immune defendant and consequently as frivolous under the screening statute.

Claims against Detective Murphy

The court dismissed damages claims based on Murphy’s testimony under witness immunity. Witnesses are absolutely immune from Section 1983 damages liability for their testimony, even if the testimony was allegedly false.

The court treated allegations about Murphy’s arrest or confinement of Dillon as false-arrest claims. It held that probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to such a claim and that a conviction conclusively establishes probable cause when the conviction survives appeal. Because Dillon’s conviction survived appeal, the court dismissed the false-arrest claims for failure to state a claim.

The court also treated Dillon’s allegations as malicious-prosecution claims. Such a claim requires a favorable end to the criminal case, and the opinion states that Dillon’s conviction had not been invalidated or overturned. The court therefore dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim, but did so without prejudice to Dillon’s asserting them again in a separate civil action if the conviction is invalidated or otherwise overturned.

Claims against defense attorney James McQueeney

The court dismissed Dillon’s Section 1983 claims against McQueeney for failure to state a claim. A Section 1983 claim requires a violation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law, meaning through authority or conduct fairly attributable to the state. The court stated that a defense attorney’s representation of a criminal defendant ordinarily does not constitute state action, whether the attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. Dillon alleged that McQueeney represented him but alleged no facts showing that McQueeney acted as a state actor.

Challenges to the state-court conviction

To the extent Dillon challenged the final judgment of conviction itself, the court dismissed those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine prevents federal district courts from acting as appellate courts reviewing final state-court judgments. The court found that Dillon had lost in state court, complained of injuries caused by the state-court judgment, sought federal review of that judgment, and was challenging a judgment entered before this federal case began.

The court also noted that a prisoner may not use Section 1983 to challenge the fact or duration of confinement; that type of challenge must be brought through a petition for federal review of the imprisonment. The opinion states that Dillon had previously sought such relief concerning this conviction, unsuccessfully.

Disposition

The court dismissed the Section 1983 action. Specifically, it dismissed: Dillon’s claims against Wittner under judicial immunity and as frivolous; his damages claims against Rosen under prosecutorial immunity and as frivolous; his damages claims against Murphy based on testimony under witness immunity; his false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims against Murphy for failure to state a claim; his claims against McQueeney for failure to state a claim; and claims challenging the final state-court conviction for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court denied leave to amend because it found that the defects could not be cured by amendment. It also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status.