Spence v. John or Jane Doe 1-10

Background

Calvin Spence sued the City of New York, Police Officer Kevin Weber, and John or Jane Doe 1-10 under Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as New York State law. He alleged that officers arrested him on January 25, 2019, struck and kicked him, searched him unlawfully, and violated other rights during and after the arrest. Spence alleged claims for false arrest and imprisonment, unlawful search and seizure, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, denial of a fair trial, unequal treatment based on race or other impermissible considerations, conspiracy, excessive force, failure to intervene, assault and battery, negligent hiring and supervision, and municipal liability.

Spence was charged with menacing and weapon-possession offenses and later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in satisfaction of all crimes charged in connection with the arrest. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not provide enough factual allegations to state a legally valid claim.

Claims Dismissed With Prejudice

The court dismissed Counts Three and Four, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, because Spence’s guilty plea established probable cause for the arrest. It dismissed Counts One and Two, alleging unlawful search and seizure, because the plea also established the lawfulness of the arrest and the related search.

The court dismissed Counts Seven and Eight, alleging malicious prosecution, because the guilty plea established probable cause and meant the prosecution did not end in Spence’s favor. It dismissed Counts Nine and Ten, alleging malicious abuse of process, because the plea barred the claim under the court’s analysis.

The court dismissed Counts Eleven and Twelve, alleging denial of a fair trial, because Spence provided only legal conclusions and did not identify the allegedly fabricated evidence or the defendants responsible for fabricating it. The court specified that these counts were dismissed with prejudice.

Claims Dismissed With Leave to Replead

The court dismissed Counts Five, Six, Sixteen, and Seventeen, involving assault and battery, excessive force, and failure to intervene, because the complaint improperly referred to the officer defendants as a group instead of identifying what each defendant allegedly did. The court granted leave to provide facts specifying each individual defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct.

The court dismissed Counts Thirteen and Fourteen, alleging denial of equal protection, because Spence did not respond to the defendants’ argument that he had failed to identify similarly situated people who were treated differently. The court granted leave to provide facts about different treatment and the allegedly impermissible reason for it.

The court dismissed Count Fifteen, alleging a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, because the allegations were legal conclusions without supporting facts. The court also stated that the conspiracy claims were likely barred by the rule that employees of the same entity generally cannot conspire with one another while acting within their employment. The court granted leave to provide facts describing the alleged conspiracy and any improper personal interest motivating particular defendants.

The court dismissed Count Eighteen, alleging negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision by the City, because Spence alleged only legal conclusions. The court granted leave to provide supporting facts. It also dismissed Count Nineteen, alleging that a City policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations, because Spence did not identify a particular policy or adequately allege a causal connection. The court granted leave to replead that claim with factual allegations rather than legal conclusions.

Other Rulings and Disposition

The court denied the portion of the motion seeking dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds as moot because it dismissed the claims against the officer defendants on other grounds. The court stated that this denial was without prejudice to renewal if Spence repleaded his claims.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the state-law claims based on New York General Municipal Law Section 50-i. Although the complaint did not include the required allegation concerning the notice of claim, the defendants conceded that more than 30 days had passed since the notice was served and that payment or adjustment had been refused. The court therefore deemed the complaint amended to satisfy Section 50-i.

The conclusion states that the motion to dismiss was denied insofar as it relied on qualified immunity and Section 50-i and was otherwise granted in its entirety. Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Seven through Twelve were dismissed with prejudice. Spence was granted leave to replead Counts Five, Six, and Thirteen through Nineteen within 21 days. Claims not timely repleaded would be dismissed with prejudice and without further advance notice.