Brown v. Saul

Background

Tito Brown sought judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income. Brown had a long history of serious mental illness, including diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and also had hypertension, type II diabetes, asthma, an umbilical hernia, and a heart attack in October 2019.

Before and after his release from prison, Brown received intensive mental-health treatment. Dora Gutierrez, Psy.D., described his need for substantial structure and support and warned that he could become unstable in the community with less support. After his release, Brown lived in a shelter for people with mental-health problems and participated in intensive case management and mental-health and substance-abuse treatment programs.

An administrative law judge held a telephone hearing on May 27, 2020. On July 6, 2020, the administrative law judge found that Brown had several severe impairments but could perform a restricted range of light work. The judge found that jobs existed in significant numbers that Brown could perform and concluded that he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review on January 27, 2021.

The Parties’ Positions

Brown filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Brown argued, among other things, that the administrative law judge did not fully credit his testimony or the medical opinions supporting his claim. The Commissioner argued that the decision was supported by substantial evidence and contained no legal error.

Court’s Analysis

Judge Moses identified three errors requiring a remand.

First, the administrative law judge did not mention or evaluate Dr. Gutierrez’s report and letter. The judge was not required to accept Dr. Gutierrez’s ultimate opinion about whether Brown could work because that issue was reserved to the Commissioner. But the administrative law judge was required to consider the rest of her opinions, including her observations about Brown’s history, response to structure, risk of decompensation, and need for continuing support. The failure to consider those opinions was legal error and was not harmless because the opinions addressed Brown’s ability to handle stress, a subject on which the administrative law judge rejected another provider’s opinion.

Second, the administrative law judge failed to consider whether Brown’s intensive treatment schedule would interfere with full-time employment. The record showed that Brown had participated in extensive therapy and other treatment, and a vocational expert testified that employers would not tolerate even one or two absences per month on a continuing basis. The court found that the administrative law judge did not consider the effects of treatment, including its frequency, duration, and disruption to Brown’s routine, when determining his work capacity.

Third, the administrative law judge improperly relied on personal judgment in determining Brown’s physical capacity. The administrative law judge accepted as persuasive Dr. Putcha’s December 2019 opinion that Brown was limited to sedentary work after his heart attack and stent procedure, but nevertheless found that Brown could perform light work by July 2020. The administrative law judge did not identify an updated medical opinion or specific medical evidence showing that Brown’s ability to stand, walk, or lift had improved. Judge Moses concluded that the administrative law judge improperly filled that gap with personal medical judgment.

Disposition

The court granted Brown’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the opinion and order. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case.