Citizens United To Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge

Background

Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods (CUPON), Hilda Kogut, Robert Asselbergs, and Carole Goodman sued the Village of Chestnut Ridge, New York. They alleged that the Village violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by adopting Local Law #1 of 2019, a zoning law concerning houses of worship that allegedly favored the Orthodox Jewish Coalition (OJC). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The challenged law created three categories of religious uses: residential gathering places, neighborhood places of worship, and community places of worship. The plaintiffs alleged that the Village worked with OJC while drafting the law and did not give other religious organizations or residents a comparable role. The Village approved the law on February 21, 2019.

The Village moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, including whether plaintiffs have standing. Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether a complaint adequately states a legally plausible claim. Several organizations and congregations also moved to intervene as defendants.

Standing and the Individual Plaintiffs

The court addressed standing first because it determines whether a federal court has authority to hear a case. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an actual or imminent injury, a connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable ruling would remedy the injury.

The court held that the individual plaintiffs had not alleged a concrete and particularized injury. They did not allege that they sought and were denied a benefit under the new zoning law or identify a specific way in which the law disadvantaged them. The court characterized their alleged concerns about future houses of worship and the changed character of their neighborhoods as conjectural or hypothetical rather than a present injury.

The individual plaintiffs also relied on three theories recognized in some Establishment Clause cases:

- Taxpayer standing: The plaintiffs alleged that the Village paid a planning firm to review the proposed zoning law. The court held that they did not identify a measurable amount of municipal spending or lost revenue attributable to the challenged activity. - Direct-exposure standing: The plaintiffs argued that future houses of worship would serve as continuing reminders of the government’s alleged religious endorsement. The court held that they did not allege either an economic injury from a religion-based law or direct exposure to a government-promoted religious expression. - Denial-of-benefits standing: The court held that the plaintiffs did not allege that they had been denied any benefit because of religion.

The court therefore concluded that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing under each theory presented.

CUPON’s Standing

The court separately considered CUPON’s associational and organizational standing. Associational standing allows an organization to sue on behalf of members who could sue in their own right. Because the individual plaintiffs lacked standing and CUPON did not identify other members who had standing, the court held that CUPON lacked associational standing.

Organizational standing requires an injury to the organization itself, rather than merely a setback to its general goals. The court found that CUPON alleged opposition to the zoning law and advocacy for a comprehensive planning process, but did not allege an injury to its activities or that it had diverted resources because of the law. The court therefore held that CUPON also lacked organizational standing.

Disposition

After finding that all plaintiffs lacked standing, the court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court did not reach the plaintiffs’ claim that the zoning law violated the Establishment Clause, the Village’s arguments about whether the claim was adequately pleaded, or the Village’s arguments concerning abstention based on two pending state-court actions.

The court granted the Village’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court explained that a dismissal based on lack of Article III standing cannot be entered with prejudice. The court also denied the proposed intervenors’ motion to intervene as moot and directed the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Village without prejudice and terminate the two motions.