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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 30, 2022

Fellah v. City University of New York

Judge
John Cronan
Docket
1:20-cv-06423
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
20
Civil RightsEmploymentMotion to DismissSection 1983
In one sentence

In Fellah v. City University of New York, Judge Cronan granted Miller’s dismissal motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing four claims.

Who this affects

Tarik Fellah’s claims against Michelle Miller were partly dismissed and partly allowed to continue. Fellah may amend four dismissed claims, while his direct New York State claim was dismissed with prejudice. The order did not resolve claims against defendants who did not move to dismiss.

What happened

Fellah v. City University of New York concerns Tarik Fellah’s claims that coworker Daniel Cregan subjected him to years of racial, religious, and anti-immigrant harassment, ending in a 2019 physical attack. Defendant Michelle Miller, one of Fellah’s supervisors, asked the court to dismiss the seven claims against her for insufficient factual allegations.

The court dismissed Fellah’s claims against Miller under federal civil-rights laws and his state-law aiding claim, as well as his negligent-supervision claim. The dismissal of his direct state hostile-work-environment claim was with prejudice; the other dismissals were without prejudice, and the court allowed Fellah to amend four claims. The court denied Miller’s request to dismiss Fellah’s two New York City Human Rights Law claims.

Judge John P. Cronan ruled that Fellah had not adequately alleged Miller’s personal involvement or discriminatory intent for the federal claims, or the required role and knowledge for the state claims. He found that Fellah’s allegations were sufficient at this stage for the New York City claims to continue.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Fellah v. City University of New York · No. 1:20-cv-06423
Judge
John Cronan
Date
Sept. 30, 2022

Background

Tarik Fellah sued the City University of New York, Hunter College, and several supervisors, including Michelle Miller. He alleged that coworker Daniel Cregan subjected him to repeated harassment based on his religion, race, national origin, ethnicity, and immigrant status, and that Cregan attacked him with a metal shovel on February 27, 2019. Fellah alleged that he complained to Miller about Cregan’s conduct and that Miller advised him to report the complaints to higher-level supervisors or submit written reports, but took no other action.

Miller moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Her motion concerned the seven claims Fellah brought against her: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983; hostile-work-environment and aiding-and-abetting claims under the New York State Human Rights Law; negligent supervision and retention; and hostile-work-environment and aiding-and-abetting claims under the New York City Human Rights Law.

Federal claims

The court dismissed Fellah’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims against Miller. For these claims, Fellah had to plausibly allege that Miller was personally involved in the alleged violation. The court held that the allegations showed, at most, that Miller failed to take sufficient action after receiving complaints; they did not show that she personally created the hostile work environment. The court also found insufficient allegations that Miller knew the reported conduct was discriminatory or acted with discriminatory intent. The § 1981 claim additionally failed because the complaint did not adequately allege that Miller knew of race-based conduct, and § 1981 covers race discrimination.

New York State Human Rights Law claims

The court dismissed with prejudice Fellah’s direct hostile-work-environment claim under section 296(1)(h) of the New York State Human Rights Law. The court explained that Miller was alleged to be a CUNY Peace Officer and employee, not an “employer” who could be individually liable under that statute. The court also dismissed without prejudice Fellah’s state-law aiding-and-abetting claim. Fellah did not adequately allege that Miller knew enough about the discriminatory nature of Cregan’s conduct to share Cregan’s intent or purpose.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The court denied Miller’s motion to dismiss both New York City Human Rights Law claims. It held that Fellah adequately alleged employee liability for a hostile work environment and aiding-and-abetting liability. Under the city law, a plaintiff need not show conduct that was severe or pervasive; the relevant question at this stage was whether Fellah was treated less well because of a protected characteristic. Fellah alleged that Miller was an immediate supervisor who could receive and address discrimination complaints, that he reported Cregan’s religious and immigration-related comments to her, and that she took no action beyond advising him to make written reports.

The court declined to decide before discovery whether Miller’s potential liability should be treated as direct employee liability or aiding-and-abetting liability under the city law.

Negligent supervision and retention

The court dismissed without prejudice Fellah’s negligent-supervision and retention claim. Under New York law, that claim requires an employer-employee relationship between the defendant and the person who committed the underlying wrong. The complaint alleged that Miller supervised Fellah, not Cregan, and therefore did not allege the required relationship between Miller and Cregan.

Disposition

The court granted Miller’s motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It dismissed Fellah’s Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action against Miller without prejudice, dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action against her with prejudice, and denied the motion as to the Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action. The court granted Fellah leave to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action, if he could do so, within thirty days of the Opinion and Order. The order concerned Miller’s motion and did not rule on claims against defendants who had not moved to dismiss.

The authoritative version

Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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