Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
←Back to docket
S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 30, 2022

Lewis v. Steward

Judge
Paul Engelmayer
Docket
1:19-cv-08085
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
17
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissConsumer CreditPro Se
In one sentence

In Lewis v. Steward, Judge Engelmayer dismissed Bernard Lewis’s claims against four moving defendants with prejudice and denied leave to amend after adopting Judge Wang’s recommendation.

Who this affects

Bernard Lewis and the four moving defendants—Annemarie E. Steward, Robert T. Van De Mark, Rodney A. Giove, and Legal Servicing, LLC. Lewis’s claims against those defendants were dismissed with prejudice, and he was denied leave to amend; the order did not resolve all claims against the other defendants.

What happened

Lewis v. Steward involved Bernard Lewis’s claims against several people and companies arising from state-court default judgments over unpaid credit-card debt. Lewis alleged violations of federal debt-collection and racketeering laws, New York law governing attorney deceit, and negligence.

The defendants seeking judgment on the pleadings were Annemarie E. Steward, Robert T. Van De Mark, Rodney A. Giove, and Legal Servicing, LLC. Lewis alleged that they were involved in improper service, collection efforts, renewal of a judgment, and an attempted property auction.

Judge Engelmayer adopted Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang’s recommendation, dismissed Lewis’s claims against those moving defendants with prejudice, and denied Lewis permission to amend his complaint. The ruling did not resolve claims against every other defendant in the case.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Lewis v. Steward · No. 1:19-cv-08085
Judge
Paul Engelmayer
Date
Sept. 30, 2022

Background

Bernard Lewis, representing himself, sued Annemarie E. Steward, Legal Servicing, LLC, Robert T. Van De Mark, North American Process Serving, LLC, Rodney A. Giove, Robert Crandail, William Singler, Resolution Management, LLC, Mark H. Stein, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Erin Capital Management, LLC. His claims arose from two state-court default judgments connected to unpaid credit-card debt. The complaint asserted claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a federal law regulating debt collection; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; New York Judiciary Law § 487(1), which concerns attorney deceit; and state-law negligence.

Lewis alleged that the debt was inaccurate, not owed, or otherwise uncollectable. He also alleged that defendants participated in improper service of legal papers, sometimes called “sewer service,” and later pursued collection of a default judgment, including a renewed judgment and an attempted auction of property. The opinion states that Lewis’s claims against Chase had previously been dismissed. This order concerned the motion filed by Steward, Van De Mark, Giove, and Legal Servicing, referred to as the moving defendants.

Motion and review of the recommendation

The moving defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). That procedure allows a court to decide a case from the pleadings after they are complete and uses the same legal standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court generally accepts the nonmoving party’s factual allegations as true, but the complaint must contain enough facts to make liability plausible rather than merely recite legal conclusions.

Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang recommended granting the motion and denying leave to amend. Lewis objected, but Judge Engelmayer found that his objections were conclusory, repeated allegations from the complaint, or addressed matters outside the pleadings. The court therefore reviewed the recommendation for clear error and found none. The court noted that the recommendation did not rely on the doctrines that can require federal courts to abstain from certain state-court matters, and it declined to rule on whether those doctrines applied.

Claims against the moving defendants

New York Judiciary Law § 487(1)

The court dismissed Lewis’s claims against Giove and Steward under New York Judiciary Law § 487(1). The court held that, even assuming the claims were timely, the complaint did not plausibly allege that Giove or Steward acted with an intent to deceive the court or a party, or that their conduct was extreme or egregious as required for this claim.

Negligence

The court dismissed the negligence claims against Giove, Steward, and Van De Mark. The court noted that the timing of the alleged injury and damages was unclear, but stated that even assuming the claims were timely, the complaint did not plausibly allege that these defendants owed Lewis a legal duty in their work for a debt collector. Without a duty, the negligence claim failed as a matter of law.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The court dismissed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims against Steward, Van De Mark, and Legal Servicing. It found that most of the alleged events occurred more than one year before Lewis filed the complaint, making the claims time barred. The court also stated that, even assuming the claims were timely, the complaint relied on conclusory statements and did not provide concrete facts plausibly showing that the moving defendants violated the statute.

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

The court dismissed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against the moving defendants. It held that Lewis’s allegations did not plausibly establish a criminal enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, or the other required elements of the claim. The court specifically characterized allegations that defendants followed one another’s directions or acted together as conclusory.

Disposition

The court adopted Judge Wang’s Report and Recommendation in full, dismissed Lewis’s claims against the moving defendants with prejudice, and denied Lewis leave to amend the complaint. The court stated that amendment would be futile because some claims were untimely and the remaining claims lacked required allegations. It directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at docket 76. The opinion also states that the moving defendants had counterclaims, and that several other defendants had not appeared; this order did not resolve those matters.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.