Carroll v. Trump

Background

E. Jean Carroll brought a defamation action against Donald J. Trump in his personal capacity. The alleged defamation concerned Trump’s denial of Carroll’s allegation that he raped her in a department-store fitting room.

The United States previously sought to replace Trump as the defendant under the Westfall Act, a federal law that can protect government employees from lawsuits for conduct within the scope of their employment. The district court previously denied that request on two independent grounds: it ruled that Trump was not a government “employee” under the Act and that, even if he were, the alleged defamation was not within the scope of his employment. The United States and Trump appealed.

The Second Circuit later ruled that Trump was an employee under the Act, but it did not decide whether he acted within the scope of his employment. Instead, it sent that question to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals because District of Columbia law was unclear. That question remained unresolved when Trump filed the motion addressed in this opinion.

Trump’s motion

Trump argued that the Justice Department’s certification that he acted within the scope of his employment automatically substituted the United States for him as the defendant. He also asked the court to stay, or pause, all proceedings while the scope-of-employment question was pending.

Carroll opposed both requests. She argued that the certification was conclusive only for removing a case from state court, not for finally deciding whether substitution was proper. She also argued that the United States had previously treated substitution as requiring a court order and that a stay would cause further delay.

Substitution ruling

The court rejected Trump’s automatic-substitution argument. Reading the relevant Westfall Act provisions together, the court concluded that the Justice Department’s certification is conclusive for removal purposes but remains subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court’s precedent also establishes that such a certification does not automatically make the United States the defendant when the certification is disputed.

The court explained that substitution required both a determination that Trump was a government employee and a determination that he acted within the scope of that employment. Although the Second Circuit had decided the first question in Trump’s favor, it had not resolved the second. Because judicial review of the certification was incomplete, the court ruled that substitution would be premature.

Stay ruling

The court considered the usual factors for a stay: the applicant’s likelihood of success, possible irreparable harm without a stay, harm to other parties, and the public interest.

The court ruled that Trump had not shown a strong likelihood of success because the scope-of-employment question could be resolved either way. It also found that the remaining discovery—principally the depositions of Carroll and Trump—would not impose an undue burden or cause irreparable harm. The court noted that discovery had already been substantially completed and that Trump had previously pursued discovery despite making similar arguments for a stay.

The court further found that a stay would substantially injure Carroll by causing additional delay. It noted that the appeal had already taken substantial time, that the remaining appellate process could be lengthy, and that Carroll intended to bring a separate claim after New York’s Adult Survivors Act took effect. The court concluded that evidence concerning the alleged rape would be relevant to both matters and that delaying discovery in this case would not make sense.

Disposition

The court denied Trump’s letter motion. The United States was not substituted for Trump, and the proceedings were not stayed. The opinion did not decide whether Trump acted within the scope of his employment or whether Trump defamed Carroll.