Mendez v. Banks

Background

Eileen Mendez, as legal guardian of A.C., and the parents of four other students sued David C. Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City Department of Education. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Education had failed to fund their children’s pendency placements for the 2022–2023 extended school year. “Pendency” refers to maintaining a student’s current educational placement while proceedings under the federal special-education statute are pending.

Three children had received Orders on Pendency less than one month before the lawsuit was filed. The other two plaintiffs had Pendency Implementation Forms but had not received formal Orders on Pendency when the lawsuit began. The plaintiffs did not allege that their children’s placements at iBrain were at risk.

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction requiring the Department of Education to immediately implement each child’s pendency order by funding tuition and related services, including transportation and nursing where applicable. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party generally must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable injury, a favorable balance of hardships, and that the injunction would serve the public interest.

The Department of Education did not contest that the plaintiffs were entitled to funding or reimbursement for the services identified in the underlying Orders on Pendency and Pendency Implementation Forms. It represented that, as of October 7, 2022, all payments were in process.

Court’s Analysis

The court focused on irreparable injury. It reasoned that the dispute concerned educational funding rather than the children’s educational placements. Because the plaintiffs did not allege that delayed payments threatened the placements, the court concluded that money damages would provide an adequate remedy and that the plaintiffs could not show irreparable injury.

The plaintiffs argued that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) created an automatic preliminary injunction, eliminating the need to prove irreparable harm. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the statute’s text addresses a child’s educational placement, not funding. The court also concluded that the cited appellate authority involved pendency funding only when it directly affected placement. The opinion noted that other courts in the circuit had denied similar requests for immediate pendency payments.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction. It also requested that the Clerk terminate docket entry 10 as moot, instructed the parties to continue conferring in good faith, and required a joint status letter by October 28, 2022.