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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Oct. 19, 2022

Hubbard v. Commissioner of Social Security

Judge
Andrew Krause
Docket
7:19-cv-00282-AEK
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
9
Social SecurityFee PetitionCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Hubbard v. Commissioner of Social Security, Judge Krause denied EAJA fees because the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified.

Who this affects

Susan Hubbard’s request for attorney’s fees and costs was denied; the Commissioner of Social Security did not have to pay the requested EAJA award.

What happened

In Hubbard v. Commissioner of Social Security, Susan Hubbard challenged the denial of her disability benefits. The court had previously sent her case back to the Social Security Administration because the administrative law judge who decided it was not properly appointed.

Hubbard sought $6,734.48 in attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. She argued that the Commissioner’s position was unreasonable, while the Commissioner argued that the law was unsettled when she defended the case and that Hubbard had not raised the appointment issue during the agency proceedings.

The court found that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, even though the court ultimately rejected it after a later Supreme Court decision. Judge Andrew E. Krause therefore denied Hubbard’s motion for attorney’s fees.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Hubbard v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 7:19-cv-00282-AEK
Judge
Andrew Krause
Date
Oct. 19, 2022

Background

Susan Hubbard filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. An administrative law judge found that Hubbard was not disabled, and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review that decision.

In this court, Hubbard argued that the administrative law judge had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Commissioner argued that Hubbard had waived the challenge because she had not raised it during the agency proceedings. After the Supreme Court decided Carr v. Saul, this court granted Hubbard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the appointment issue and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings before a different, properly appointed administrative law judge.

Attorney’s-Fee Motion

Hubbard then sought $6,734.48 in attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, commonly called the EAJA. The court explained that an EAJA award generally requires the claimant to be the prevailing party, the government’s position not to have been substantially justified, no special circumstances making an award unjust, and a timely, properly supported fee application.

The parties did not dispute that Hubbard was the prevailing party or that her application was timely. The Commissioner did not argue that special circumstances made an award unjust. The only issue was whether the Commissioner’s position had been substantially justified—that is, whether it had a reasonable basis in law and fact.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that the Commissioner’s position during the agency proceedings was substantially justified. Hubbard had not raised the Appointments Clause issue before the administrative law judge or the Appeals Council, and the court held that the Commissioner was not required to raise the issue on her own. The administrative law judge had also issued the decision about seven months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutional appointment issue involving administrative law judges.

The court also found that the Commissioner’s position in the federal litigation was substantially justified. When the Commissioner argued in October 2019 that Hubbard had waived the appointment challenge, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had decided whether claimants had to raise such challenges during the agency proceedings. Courts were divided, and several courts had agreed with the Commissioner’s position.

Disposition

The court held that the Commissioner’s position concerning the Appointments Clause was substantially justified, even though the argument was ultimately rejected after Carr v. Saul. Judge Andrew E. Krause denied Hubbard’s motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 27.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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