Sosa v. New York City Housing Authority

Background

Joel Sosa sued his former employer, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). He alleged that NYCHA unlawfully denied his requests for leave or remote work so he could care for his son, who had serious health conditions, after the son’s school closed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sosa also alleged that NYCHA terminated his employment after he did not report for in-person work.

Sosa worked at NYCHA through IIT, Inc., a staffing company that handled his paychecks and tax form. The complaint alleged that NYCHA supervised his work, set his hours and pay, assigned his tasks, handled his leave requests, and directed its human-resources department to notify IIT that his employment had ended. Sosa asserted claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (EFMLEA), and the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (EPSLA). The latter two laws are parts of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).

Motion to Dismiss Standard

NYCHA filed a motion to dismiss, which asks the court to throw out claims because the complaint does not allege enough facts to make relief legally plausible. On this motion, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Sosa’s favor.

FMLA Claim

NYCHA argued that IIT was Sosa’s primary employer for FMLA purposes and therefore NYCHA had no obligation to provide leave. The FMLA generally requires a covered employer to provide qualifying leave, including leave to care for an immediate family member with a serious health condition. When two entities are joint employers, the primary employer has the leave obligation.

The court applied Department of Labor regulations directing courts to consider the totality of the circumstances, including who had authority over hiring and firing, assignment and placement, payroll, and benefits. The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged that NYCHA was Sosa’s primary employer. Among other things, NYCHA personnel allegedly told Sosa that failing to report to work would be treated as a voluntary separation, NYCHA directed its human-resources department to notify IIT of the termination, NYCHA had handled an earlier leave request, and IIT directed Sosa to NYCHA when he asked about leave. The complaint also alleged that IIT was a professional employer organization, for which the client employer is typically the primary employer under the regulations.

The court declined to rely on materials outside the complaint that NYCHA cited to support its argument that IIT was the primary employer. It denied the motion to dismiss the FMLA claim.

FFCRA Effective-Date Arguments

NYCHA argued that the EFMLEA and EPSLA did not apply because Sosa’s relevant events occurred before April 2, 2020. The court rejected that argument. It concluded that the laws became operational on April 1, 2020, the date Sosa’s employment allegedly ended, even though the Department of Labor’s rule described April 2 as the effective date.

The court relied on the rule’s references to leave being available beginning April 1 and on the FFCRA’s purpose of allowing employees to leave the workplace during the pandemic. It also concluded that Sosa’s alleged termination on April 1 could be actionable because the rule incorporated protections against discharge, discipline, or discrimination for exercising leave rights. The court therefore denied NYCHA’s motion to dismiss the EFMLEA and EPSLA claims based on the effective-date argument.

FFCRA Notice Argument

NYCHA alternatively argued that Sosa failed to provide the notice required before taking FFCRA leave. The court explained that the Department of Labor’s original rule required certain information before leave, but another district court later invalidated the requirement that the information be provided before leave. The Department of Labor subsequently modified the rule to allow documentation as soon as practicable.

The court found that advance notice was not a condition for taking leave and that proof of notice was not required to state an FFCRA claim. It therefore denied NYCHA’s motion to dismiss Sosa’s second and third claims based on lack of notice.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied NYCHA’s motion to dismiss the complaint in full. The opinion did not enter final judgment on the underlying claims; it ruled that Sosa’s allegations could continue past the pleading stage.