Doe v. Columbia University

Background

The court had previously dismissed some, but not all, of John Doe’s claims against Columbia University. Doe asked the court to reargue or reconsider those earlier rulings, amend them, or, alternatively, certify them for an immediate appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Doe sought reinstatement of his second, third, and fourth causes of action and restoration of injunctive relief related to his expulsion and subsequent loss of his diploma. The second cause of action concerned selective enforcement related to his interim suspension. The third was a harassment claim under Title IX, a federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in education. The fourth concerned the alleged erroneous outcome of the proceeding involving Jane Doe 1.

Reconsideration

The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits relief from certain final judgments and orders, did not apply because the earlier orders were not final. The court had dismissed some claims while leaving others pending, so the orders were partial, nonfinal rulings.

The court considered the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Southern District of New York Local Rule 6.3, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). These rules permit reconsideration in limited circumstances, such as when the court overlooked controlling law or important facts, when controlling law has changed, when new evidence is available, or when correction is needed to prevent a clear error or manifest injustice. The court concluded that Doe had not met that standard.

The court declined to reconsider the dismissal of the selective-enforcement claim because Doe was repeating arguments the court had already considered. The court had previously concluded that the students Doe identified as comparators were not similarly situated because they faced materially less serious allegations when Columbia imposed Doe’s interim suspension.

The court also declined to reconsider the dismissal of Doe’s Title IX harassment claim. Doe relied mainly on Columbia’s response to a student blog post and related comments, but the court had already rejected the argument that those allegations supported a Title IX harassment claim.

The court left in place its decision barring Doe from seeking injunctive relief related to his expulsion and loss of his diploma. Although the court agreed that Doe had adequately alleged a causal connection between Columbia’s actions and his injuries for purposes of standing, it explained that Doe’s motion did not address the separate reason for denying that relief: claim preclusion, a doctrine that can prevent a party from relitigating matters resolved in an earlier case.

The court separately examined the fourth cause of action concerning the outcome of the Jane Doe 1 proceeding. It explained that issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, can prevent relitigation of issues already decided in an earlier proceeding. The court concluded that the earlier state-court proceeding had addressed the factual matters Doe relied on, including consent, incapacitation, Columbia’s consideration of evidence, and the alleged differing treatment of credibility.

The court stated that a Title IX erroneous-outcome claim may be plausibly pleaded by alleging a clearly irregular investigative or disciplinary process, including direct procedural irregularities or facts supporting an inference of bias. But the court found that Doe’s allegations principally challenged Columbia’s evaluation of the evidence. Because the earlier state-court findings barred Doe from relitigating the factual basis for that challenge, the court concluded that he had not plausibly stated the fourth cause of action. That claim therefore remained dismissed.

Request for Immediate Appeal

Doe also asked the court to certify the earlier orders for an immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That provision permits certification of certain nonfinal orders only when there is a controlling legal question, substantial disagreement about the correct answer, and a likelihood that an immediate appeal would materially advance the litigation.

The court found that Doe had not adequately argued that these requirements were met. It also concluded that the issues Doe identified involved mixed questions of law and fact rather than pure legal questions, that there was no substantial disagreement about the governing legal standards, and that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the case.

Disposition

The court denied Doe’s motion for reargument, reconsideration, and amendment of the August 2021 and September 2022 orders. It also denied his alternative request to certify those orders for appeal. The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion.