Skorupska v. 525 West 52 Property Owner LLC

Background

In an earlier opinion, the court granted three defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed Bernadette Skorupska’s claims under the Fair Housing Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The Clerk entered judgment on September 2, 2022. Skorupska then moved for reconsideration of several findings. She was representing herself, so the court read her submission liberally and considered the strongest arguments supported by it.

Legal standard

The court explained that reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 is an extraordinary remedy used sparingly. The moving party must identify controlling law or facts that the court overlooked and that could reasonably change the result. The limited grounds include an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, clear error, or the need to prevent serious injustice. Reconsideration is not a way to relitigate old issues, present new theories, or obtain another hearing on the merits.

ADA access claim

Skorupska argued that her desire to obtain a two-bedroom apartment in the building and her efforts to return there gave her standing to pursue an accessibility claim under Title III of the ADA. The court noted that her amended complaint requested only compensatory and punitive damages, not an order requiring defendants to provide an apartment. The court stated that this alone supported denying reconsideration.

The court nevertheless considered whether she would have standing to seek an order requiring access. A person seeking such an order must show a likely future injury, not only a past injury. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that Skorupska could satisfy two parts of that test: a past ADA injury and a reasonable basis to infer that discriminatory treatment would continue. It found that she had not shown a reasonable intention to return to the building. She no longer lived there, had not stated that she visited after moving out of her one-bedroom apartment, and had not identified definite plans to visit in the future. She said she intended to return only if given a two-bedroom apartment, and the court found no reason to doubt defendants’ statement that no such set-aside apartments were available in the building when summary judgment was briefed. The court therefore left standing its grant of summary judgment on the ADA access claim.

Comparison with another resident

Skorupska relied on the experience of Anna Hernandez, another resident with a child described as having special needs, to support an alleged pattern of discrimination. The court had previously found important differences between the two situations: Hernandez had not applied for a disability set-aside apartment and was not a voucher recipient. On reconsideration, Skorupska argued that both women had their numbers skipped and received less desirable apartments. The court concluded that Hernandez’s experience did not create a triable issue of fact because the relevant circumstances underlying Skorupska’s claims were different.

Deposition challenge

Skorupska also asserted that the deposition of Nickeisha Silvera was “staged” because Silvera was not the person called “Nicky” with whom Skorupska had spoken. Counsel for Phipps Houses Services, Inc. responded that Silvera was the person deposed and argued that any discrepancy about the representatives with whom Skorupska communicated should have been raised during discovery. The court agreed that the issue was not a basis for reconsideration. It also noted that Skorupska did not ask the court to take a specific action based on the information.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Polk Failla denied Skorupska’s motion for reconsideration. The opinion did not alter the earlier summary judgment or the judgment entered in the case.