G.T. v. Castillo, M.D.

Background

G.T., identified as an infant acting through her mother and natural guardian, Elizabeth Reyes, and Reyes individually, sued Wilfrido Castillo, M.D., Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center, BronxCare Health System, Saeed Oraee, M.D., Woodlawn Medical Associates, P.C., Mrudula Premkumar, M.D., and Jing Ja Yoon, M.D. The complaint alleged medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, and loss of the infant’s services and companionship. The alleged negligent care included prenatal, obstetric, neonatal, perinatal, pediatric, and other critical care, including an alleged failure to timely perform a Cesarean section. The complaint alleged that G.T. suffered serious and permanent injuries.

During the relevant period, Castillo was an employee of Urban Health Plan, Inc., a health center that received federal grant funds. The Secretary of Health and Human Services had deemed Urban Health and its employees to be employees of the Public Health Service for 2017 and 2018. Under the federal statutes discussed by the court, the Federal Tort Claims Act provided the exclusive remedy for covered injuries caused by Public Health Service employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Procedural history and parties’ arguments

The Government moved to substitute the United States for Castillo and to dismiss the complaint against the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs did not oppose substitution. They opposed dismissal, arguing that more than six months had passed after their administrative claim was submitted before the case was removed, so they believed the exhaustion requirement was satisfied by the time the case became an action against the United States.

Court’s analysis

The court held that substitution was automatic because Castillo was covered as a Public Health Service employee, the United States Attorney certified that he acted within the scope of his employment, and trial had not begun in state court.

The court then applied the Federal Tort Claims Act’s administrative-exhaustion requirement. That requirement generally prohibits a lawsuit for money damages against the United States based on an employee’s negligence until the claimant has either received a written agency denial or waited six months after presenting the administrative claim without a final agency decision. The court treated exhaustion as a jurisdictional prerequisite, meaning that failure to satisfy it deprived the federal court of authority to hear the claim.

Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Celestine, the court held that the requirement applies when a lawsuit begins in state court against an individual who is later determined to be a covered federal employee. The relevant filing date was therefore the date the plaintiffs filed the state-court action against Castillo, not the later date when the United States removed the case and was substituted as defendant. Because the plaintiffs filed the state-court action before receiving a final agency denial and before six months had passed from their administrative filing, the action was premature.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on decisions from other courts that treated exhaustion as arising only after removal or substitution. It explained that the Westfall Act allows a plaintiff to pursue a new federal action after dismissal if the claim was timely when the original lawsuit was filed and the administrative claim is presented within the statutory period after dismissal. The court therefore concluded that dismissal was required even though the plaintiffs’ administrative claim remained pending and more than six months had later passed.

The Government also argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the negligence claim against Castillo under the derivative-jurisdiction doctrine. The court did not decide that issue because it dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the administrative-exhaustion ground.

Disposition

Judge Liman granted the motion to substitute the United States as defendant in place of Castillo and to dismiss the complaint as against the United States without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The opinion states that the dismissal did not necessarily bar a later federal action after the applicable administrative requirements were satisfied.