Rodo Inc. v. Guimaraes

Background

The order resolves the parties’ dispute over the terms of a proposed protective order for information produced in the litigation. The parties agreed on all terms except which materials could receive an “Highly Confidential – Attorney’s Eyes Only” designation. Information with that designation could be provided to the parties’ lawyers, the court, and certain experts, but not directly to the parties.

The parties agreed that information concerning Rodo’s “Pricing Engine” software qualified for that designation. They disagreed about whether the same protection should cover the names, contact information, and business information of Rodo’s data providers, dealers, customers, and brokers, as well as lists containing that information.

Arguments and Legal Standard

Rodo argued that the information was the type of sensitive trade-secret information that the defendants were alleged to have misappropriated and that giving the defendants access could cause irreparable harm. The defendants argued that the claimed harm was speculative and that withholding the information from them could unfairly prevent them from preparing their defense.

The court relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G), which allows a court, for good cause, to require that trade secrets or other confidential commercial information be disclosed only in a specified way. The court explained that when deciding whether to use an attorneys’-eyes-only restriction, it must balance the producing party’s risk of economic harm against the requesting party’s need for the information. It also noted that courts have used this type of protection for customer lists and similar information when litigants compete in the same industry.

Ruling

The court found that allowing the disputed information to be designated attorneys’ eyes only appropriately balanced the parties’ interests. Rodo asserted that it was a direct competitor of the defendants’ current employer and that disclosure of commercial information, including customer lists, would cause economic harm. The court found that showing sufficient to support the protective-order provision at this stage.

The court acknowledged that the restriction could later burden the defendants’ ability to understand and respond to evidence about their personal knowledge of confidential information. It also noted that the proposed protective order allowed the court to order disclosure if the information became necessary for the defendants’ defense. The court therefore ordered a protective order consistent with its ruling, and the Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at Doc. 43. This order addressed discovery protections; it did not decide the underlying allegations of misappropriation.