Querette v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine LLC

Background

James Querette and Vincent Isernia brought a putative class action against Chromalloy Gas Turbine LLC. They asserted one claim under New York Labor Law § 191(1)(a), which requires employers to pay certain employees weekly. The plaintiffs were former Chromalloy employees and did not dispute that they were members of Local 475 IUE-CWA during the relevant period.

Chromalloy and the union had a collective bargaining agreement effective from September 19, 2018, through September 18, 2021. Article 14 established a grievance process for union members’ employment-related disputes and required arbitration before the American Arbitration Association if the dispute was not resolved through the earlier steps. The agreement broadly defined grievances to include statutory claims relating to a union member’s employment.

The agreement also included a “Private Counsel Carveout,” preserving union members’ ability to pursue an alleged right with private counsel in a forum other than the grievance process. Chromalloy moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act and to stay the case.

Whether the Court or an Arbitrator Should Decide Arbitrability

The court first considered whether the collective bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably assigned questions about arbitrability—the issue of whether a particular dispute must be arbitrated—to the arbitrator. The agreement incorporated the American Arbitration Association’s labor-dispute rules, but the court explained that incorporating those rules does not always establish such an assignment. The agreement’s language and context must also be considered.

The court concluded that the Private Counsel Carveout made the agreement ambiguous about whether all disputes had to be arbitrated. Because the carveout broadly referred to pursuing an alleged right in a forum other than arbitration, the court found that the agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court therefore decided for itself whether the plaintiffs’ wage claim was subject to arbitration.

Whether the Wage Claim Was Arbitrable

The court interpreted the collective bargaining agreement using ordinary contract principles and federal labor policies. It rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation that the Private Counsel Carveout allowed union members to avoid arbitration for any statutory claim by hiring private counsel. In the court’s view, that interpretation would make other provisions— including the provision making the grievance process the exclusive means of resolving disputes under the agreement—meaningless and would undermine the union’s exclusive role in arbitration.

The court instead interpreted the carveout narrowly. It concluded that the provision allowed union members to pursue, with private counsel and outside the grievance process, statutory claims specifically identified in Article 1, such as certain discrimination and family-leave claims. The carveout did not apply to the plaintiffs’ wage-payment claim. The court therefore held that the claim was subject to Article 14’s arbitration requirement.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern GRANTED Chromalloy’s motion to compel arbitration. The court STAYED the action pending arbitration and directed the Clerk to administratively close the case, without prejudice to either party moving to reopen it within 30 days after the arbitration proceedings concluded.