Van Stuyvesant v. Conway

Background

Curtis Van Stuyvesant was convicted in New York Supreme Court in 1999 of, among other offenses, fraud and larceny. He filed a federal petition challenging his conviction in 2003. The court denied that petition in 2007, and the Second Circuit later denied certificates of appealability and dismissed appeals from several subsequent motions.

On October 5, 2022, Van Stuyvesant filed three new motions in the previously dismissed case: a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6); a request for a speedy decision and discovery under Rule 1; and a motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 455(a) seeking transfer to the District of Columbia and recusal of the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit.

Rule 60(b) Motion

Rule 60(b) allows a court to provide relief from a final judgment for specified reasons, including newly discovered evidence, fraud by an opposing party, a void judgment, satisfaction or discharge of the judgment, or other extraordinary circumstances. Van Stuyvesant’s filing primarily argued that earlier judges had wrongly decided his habeas petition and had improperly denied his later motions. He also challenged aspects of his underlying state conviction, including due-process and right-to-counsel issues.

The court denied the Rule 60(b) motion. It held that the claims under Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) were untimely because they were filed about fifteen years after the 2007 judgment, while the claims under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), and (6) were not filed within a reasonable time. The court also found no mitigating circumstances that excused the delay.

The court separately held that much of the motion attacked the underlying criminal conviction rather than the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding. Such an attack is treated as a second or successive habeas petition, which generally requires authorization from the Court of Appeals. The court found that Van Stuyvesant had not made the required showing and denied the portions challenging his conviction as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b), rather than transferring them to the Second Circuit.

The court also rejected the portions that challenged the integrity of the habeas proceedings or earlier Rule 60(b) rulings. It found no newly discovered evidence, ruled that conclusory accusations of fraud were insufficient and that Rule 60(b)(3) concerns fraud by an opposing party, found no jurisdictional or notice-based error making the judgment void, noted that Van Stuyvesant had not presented an argument under Rule 60(b)(5), and found no extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6). The court stated that Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for a direct appeal.

Additional Motions

The request for a speedy adjudication was moot because the Rule 60(b) motion had been decided. The court denied the request for discovery because there was no disclosure outstanding or authorized under Rule 1.

The court also denied the motion seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The transfer request was moot because the motion had been decided and the case was closed. The court additionally found that Van Stuyvesant had not shown that the case could have been brought in the District of Columbia or that transfer would serve the interest of justice. As to recusal, he had not identified facts that would cause a reasonable person who knew all the facts to question the impartiality of the entire Southern District of New York or the Second Circuit.

Disposition

Judge Jennifer L. Rochon denied Van Stuyvesant’s motions under Rule 60, Rule 1, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 455(a). The Clerk of Court was directed to close the motions at ECF Nos. 82, 84, and 86.