Starkes v. United States

Background

Quentin Starkes moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. He claimed that his appointed defense lawyer, Aaron Goldsmith, provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a psychological evaluation before sentencing.

Starkes pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy and to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 28 grams of cocaine base. His plea agreement provided for a sentencing range of 100 to 125 months. The Probation Office later classified him as a career offender and calculated a guideline range of 188 to 235 months. Goldsmith objected to that classification, requested a psychological evaluation, and presented mitigating information about Starkes’s mental health, personal history, lack of education, substance abuse, and difficult childhood.

The court ultimately sentenced Starkes to 100 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. That sentence was below the career-offender guideline range and at the bottom of the range stipulated in the plea agreement. Although the court approved a psychological evaluation, none occurred before sentencing. Goldsmith later stated that he and Starkes discussed the decision not to obtain the evaluation and that Starkes acknowledged it. Starkes said he did not remember those discussions. After sentencing, Starkes obtained an evaluation from Dr. Alexander Sasha Bardey, which he submitted with his amended petition.

Legal standard

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner must satisfy both parts of the test from Strickland v. Washington. First, the lawyer’s performance must have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance. Second, the petitioner must show prejudice—a reasonable probability that the result would have been different without the lawyer’s errors. In a sentencing challenge, prejudice can be shown by a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been lower.

Court’s analysis

The court rejected Starkes’s argument that Goldsmith’s initial request for an evaluation made it automatically unreasonable not to complete one. The court stated that there is no automatic rule requiring a defense lawyer to obtain an expert. It also found that Goldsmith had consulted a licensed psychologist, who advised that an evaluation would not negate Starkes’s knowledge or intent. Goldsmith believed that a deeper examination could have produced negative consequences, including an appearance that Starkes was withdrawing his acceptance of responsibility and a possible harsher sentence.

The court also rejected the argument that Goldsmith lacked the expertise to make an informed strategic decision without further expert advice. Unlike a case in which counsel failed to investigate possible mental-deficiency defenses, Goldsmith had consulted a licensed psychologist and had investigated and presented information about Starkes’s background and mental health. The court concluded that Goldsmith reasonably chose to rely on the available information and argue those matters as mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), rather than proceed with the evaluation.

The court further held that Starkes failed to show deficient performance because Goldsmith presented extensive mitigating evidence, sought a sentence below the guideline range, and provided information the court considered at sentencing. The court had already been told about Starkes’s difficult childhood, mental health history, treatment, lack of education, substance abuse, and criminal history.

The court separately concluded that Starkes could not show prejudice. Dr. Bardey’s report included some new information about symptoms, diagnoses, and a traumatic experience, and Dr. Bardey believed the evaluation would have supplied additional mitigating information. But the court found that the report’s general themes, conclusions, and many details had already been presented through the presentence report and sentencing submissions. The record did not show a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a sentence shorter than 100 months if the evaluation had occurred before sentencing.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield denied the § 2255 petition. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the United States and close the case. Because Starkes had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied, the court declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying the filing fee.