Paupaw-Myrie v. Mount Vernon City School District

Background

Alexis Paupaw-Myrie, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the Mount Vernon City School District and Natasha Hunter-McGregor, identified as a District principal. Paupaw-Myrie alleged that she was a Black woman and of Native American origin and had worked for the District as a social studies teacher from September 2016 through June 30, 2021. She alleged that Hunter-McGregor commented on her hair texture, commented on her body and clothing, blocked transfers, subjected her to heightened scrutiny, sent her disciplinary or counseling communications, and treated her differently from other teachers.

Paupaw-Myrie also alleged that she complained to union officials and the District’s human-resources department in November and December 2020, and that she was later subjected to retaliation. She claimed that Hunter-McGregor ultimately did not recommend her for tenure and that she was terminated effective June 30, 2021. Her amended complaint asserted discrimination, retaliation, and hostile-work-environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Claims and Parties

The court held that Title VII does not permit individual liability, so any Title VII claims against Hunter-McGregor had to be dismissed. The court further held that Paupaw-Myrie’s § 1981 claims against the District could proceed only if she plausibly alleged that the challenged conduct resulted from a municipal policy or custom. She did not do so. The court also rejected the theory that Hunter-McGregor was a final policymaker for the District, noting that the Board of Education made the final decision concerning teacher tenure and that Hunter-McGregor had only recommended against tenure.

As a result, the court stated that Paupaw-Myrie’s Title VII claims remained only against the District and her § 1981 claims remained only against Hunter-McGregor before evaluating the claims’ sufficiency.

Discrimination Claims

The court held that termination was the only potentially actionable adverse employment action for the discrimination claims. It ruled that Paupaw-Myrie’s split-teacher assignment, increased scrutiny, counseling memoranda, and comments about her hair and body did not qualify as materially adverse employment actions under the alleged circumstances.

The court also found that the allegations did not plausibly suggest that race or Native American origin caused the termination. It treated the hair comment as an isolated remark made more than a year before the termination and found no alleged connection between that remark and the tenure or termination decision. The court found the allegations concerning Zoom bombing and heightened scrutiny insufficient, including because Paupaw-Myrie did not provide enough information about allegedly better-treated teachers to establish a meaningful comparison. The court therefore dismissed the Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims.

Retaliation Claims

The court examined Paupaw-Myrie’s complaints to the union and human-resources personnel. It held that the union complaint was not protected activity because she did not allege that it was communicated to the employer. It also held that the December complaint and the emails about disciplinary meetings and aggressive treatment did not plausibly communicate opposition to discrimination based on race or national origin. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the November 11 complaint about hair, body, and clothing was protected activity, although it described Paupaw-Myrie’s characterization of that complaint as a race- or origin-discrimination complaint as conclusory.

The court ruled that the late-night call, disciplinary meetings, and counseling letters were not materially adverse retaliatory actions. It identified termination as the only alleged action that could dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination complaint, but found no facts plausibly showing that the November complaint was the but-for cause of the March 2021 termination. The court therefore dismissed the retaliation claims.

Hostile Work Environment

The court held that the alleged conduct was not plausibly severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. It also held that Paupaw-Myrie did not plausibly connect the alleged mistreatment to her race or Native American origin. The court explained that unfair or abusive treatment, without facts showing that it occurred because of a protected characteristic, does not establish a hostile-work-environment claim. It therefore dismissed the hostile-work-environment claim.

State-Law Claims and Leave to Amend

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Paupaw-Myrie’s New York State Human Rights Law claims. The court also noted that any claim under the New York City Human Rights Law would not apply to the alleged conduct in Mount Vernon, which the opinion identified as being in Westchester County.

The court declined to grant leave to amend on its own initiative. It noted that Paupaw-Myrie had already amended her complaint after a pre-motion conference during which the pleading problems had been discussed, had not asked to amend again, and had not indicated what additional facts would cure the deficiencies.

Disposition

Judge Cathy Seibel granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The opinion directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion and close the case. The order did not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” qualification to the motion’s disposition.