de Paulino v. New York City Department of Education

Background

The plaintiffs—parents and guardians suing individually and for 12 students—moved for a preliminary injunction against the New York City Department of Education and David C. Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor. They alleged that the students had disabilities covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and were entitled to remain in their educational placements during administrative and judicial proceedings about their education.

The plaintiffs sought an order requiring the Department to immediately fund the students’ tuition, transportation, and other services at the International Institute for the Brain, or iBRAIN, for the 2021–2022 extended school year. The students’ administrative proceedings had produced pendency orders or findings establishing iBRAIN as the pendency placement. Under the IDEA’s pendency, or “stay-put,” provision, a covered student generally remains at public expense in the current educational placement while the IDEA proceedings continue.

Disputed funding

After the motion was filed, the Department funded some of the placements. The parties’ later submissions stated that the placements for R.P. and C.P. were fully funded and that the Department represented that M.B.’s remaining costs had been reimbursed. The parties continued to disagree about costs for other students, including transportation, tuition, and nursing expenses. The Department maintained that some costs would be reimbursed after plaintiffs submitted invoices or in-person attendance records. It also disputed whether certain amounts were reimbursable.

The plaintiffs argued that the stay-put provision entitled them to immediate funding and that delayed reimbursement threatened their rights and caused financial harm. They also argued that the stay-put provision operated as an automatic injunction, or that they otherwise satisfied the usual requirements for a preliminary injunction. The Department argued that the dispute concerned payment rather than the students’ educational placements and that the plaintiffs had not shown any threat that a student would lose a placement.

Court’s analysis

Judge Engelmayer applied the traditional preliminary-injunction requirement that the moving party show likely irreparable harm, along with the other requirements concerning the merits, the balance of hardships, and the public interest. The court explained that the stay-put provision protects a student’s ability to remain in the current placement, but found that the record showed no risk to any student’s placement. The plaintiffs had not submitted evidence that a student had been removed or faced removal during the extended school year, which had ended months earlier.

The court rejected the argument that delayed reimbursement alone automatically entitled the plaintiffs to an injunction. The Department had not challenged the legitimacy of the placements or denied its obligation to fund them. Instead, it requested information before reimbursing some costs. The court expressly did not decide whether, or to what extent, the students’ orders required the requested invoices or attendance records.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable financial harm. Their submissions did not specify or substantiate harm beyond delayed reimbursement, and the parties’ updates indicated that some costs had been paid and that the Department intended to reimburse other costs after receiving documentation. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs had not met the preliminary-injunction standard.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It did not reach the parties’ arguments about the remaining reimbursement disputes, including the documentation requirements. The court directed the parties to continue conferring in good faith and file, by February 8, 2023, a joint status update describing the remaining disputed costs and the plaintiffs’ position on whether they would seek further remedies. The court also directed the Clerk to terminate the motions pending at docket numbers 4 and 17. The court declined to treat the motion as a request for a writ of mandamus because the plaintiffs had not styled it that way and the Department had acknowledged and substantially performed the obligations at issue.