Pujol Moreira v. Societe Generale, S.A.

Background

The plaintiffs are heirs of former owners of Banco Pujol, a Cuban bank that the Cuban government confiscated in 1960 and absorbed into Banco Nacional de Cuba. They sued Société Générale, S.A. and BNP Paribas, S.A. under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly called the Helms-Burton Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the banks trafficked in the confiscated property by doing business with Banco Nacional de Cuba.

In an earlier ruling, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against Société Générale as untimely. The court then requested additional briefing concerning whether the plaintiffs’ allegations against Paribas described trafficking within the meaning of the Helms-Burton Act and, if so, whether the court could exercise authority over Paribas. The court addressed the timeliness issue first.

Legal standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiffs. But the complaint must contain enough facts to make liability plausible, rather than merely possible or speculative.

The Helms-Burton Act imposes liability on a person who knowingly and intentionally traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government. The statute includes selling, transferring, possessing, or acquiring an interest in confiscated property; conducting commercial activity using or benefiting from that property; or causing, participating in, or profiting from another person’s trafficking.

Court’s analysis

The relevant new allegation was that Paribas routinely provided U.S. currency to Banco Nacional de Cuba in Switzerland, including in 2020, and apparently had not stopped. The court concluded that the mere delivery of cash did not fall within the statutory definition of trafficking. The complaint did not allege that the cash itself was confiscated property.

The complaint also lacked facts about the amount of currency delivered, how often deliveries occurred, what Banco Nacional de Cuba did with the money, and whether Banco Nacional de Cuba gave anything to Paribas in exchange. Without that factual context, the court found no plausible basis to infer that Paribas engaged in commercial activity using or benefiting from the plaintiffs’ confiscated property, or that Paribas participated in, caused, directed, or profited from trafficking.

The plaintiffs’ supplemental filing relied on conditional possibilities—for example, that Paribas might have profited if Banco Nacional de Cuba paid for the dollars, or might have participated in trafficking if it transferred cash for clients doing business with Banco Nacional de Cuba. The court emphasized that those allegations were not included in the Second Amended Complaint. It also rejected the plaintiffs’ position that discovery would determine whether the cash transfers involved a credit facility or client transactions, explaining that discovery cannot be used to develop a claim supported only by conclusions and speculation.

Disposition

The court held that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged trafficking occurring within the two years before they filed suit. Because the Helms-Burton Act bars an action filed more than two years after the trafficking giving rise to the action has stopped, the court concluded that the claims against Paribas were untimely.

The court granted Paribas’s motion to dismiss. It did not address Paribas’s other dismissal arguments. The court also declined to give the plaintiffs another opportunity to amend because they had already received leave to amend, did not suggest that they had additional facts that would make the claims timely, and did not request further leave to amend. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment consistent with this order and the earlier ruling, and to close the case.