Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc.

Background

Michael Reeves proceeded without a lawyer and invoked federal-question jurisdiction. He asserted “discrimination in fair housing” against CMP Consultants, Inc. His other filings named 101 West End REIT, LLC; Marita Ponce; Orlando Ponce; and Dermot Realty Management Company. The court assumed he intended to sue all five named defendants.

Reeves alleged that he won “NYC Housing Lottery Lot #641” on or about August 13, 2022, giving him the opportunity to rent an affordable apartment at 101 West End Avenue in Manhattan. He claimed that the defendants, who he said owned or managed the building, delayed or obstructed his move because of his race. He also alleged that they repeatedly requested financial and tax documents, including checking-account statements, cash-application information, and tax-return authorization forms.

Reeves had filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights and claimed that the defendants retaliated by repeatedly requesting documents. He also alleged that delays affected his Section 8 voucher and contributed to an eviction proceeding involving his current apartment. He asked the court to order the defendants to release the lottery apartment and to stop the state-court eviction proceeding.

Legal standards

Because Reeves had been allowed to proceed without prepaying court fees, the court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That law requires dismissal of an applicable complaint or claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from an immune defendant. The court also must dismiss claims when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning legal authority to hear them.

The court explained that it must read filings from people without lawyers generously, but those filings still must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 requires enough factual detail to make a claim plausible, meaning that the alleged facts support a reasonable inference that the defendant is legally responsible.

Fair Housing Act allegations

The court construed Reeves’s allegations as claims under the Fair Housing Act. The Act prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of race and other protected characteristics. It also prohibits retaliation against people who assert rights protected by the Act.

The court held that Reeves had not alleged enough facts to support a plausible race-discrimination claim. He did not identify his own race, and his statement that the building was predominantly occupied by white people did not itself show that the delays were caused by discriminatory intent. The court characterized his assertions of racial profiling and housing discrimination as legal conclusions and speculative allegations rather than supporting facts.

The court granted Reeves leave to amend so he could allege facts showing how each named person or entity discriminated against him in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The amended complaint had to provide enough factual detail for the court to determine whether each defendant could be held liable.

Request for emergency relief

The court denied Reeves’s request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. A preliminary injunction is a court order issued before final judgment that requires or prohibits conduct; a temporary restraining order is a similar emergency measure. To obtain either form of relief, Reeves had to show likely irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious legal questions combined with a strongly favorable balance of hardships.

The court concluded that, because Reeves had not alleged facts sufficient to state a Fair Housing Act discrimination claim, he had not shown a likelihood of success or sufficiently serious questions supporting emergency relief. In the discussion, the court denied the request for injunctive relief without prejudice to renewal at a later date. A footnote also stated that stopping the ongoing state-court eviction proceeding was likely barred by the federal Anti-Injunction Act or the principle requiring federal courts to refrain from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court granted Reeves 60 days from the order’s date to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint, so Reeves had to repeat any facts or claims he wanted the court to consider. The court instructed him to identify the relevant people and titles, describe each relevant event and each defendant’s conduct, explain his injuries, and state the relief requested.

The court denied the order to show cause seeking a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. It stated that no summons would issue at that time and that all other pending matters were terminated. If Reeves failed to amend within the allowed time and could not show good cause, the court said it would dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Reeves permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.