Vogelsang v. Commissioner of Social Security
- Katharine Parker
- 1:21-cv-09338
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 33
In Vogelsang v. Commissioner, Judge Parker granted Vogelsang’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded the disability decision for reconsideration.
Cally Morgan Vogelsang and the Social Security Administration; the agency must reconsider the disability-benefits decision under the court’s instructions.
What happened
In Vogelsang v. Commissioner of Social Security, Cally Morgan Vogelsang asked the court to review the agency’s decision denying her Child’s Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The Administrative Law Judge found that she was not disabled and could perform certain jobs despite her autism spectrum disorder, anxiety, selective mutism, developmental conditions, and other impairments.
The court found that the Administrative Law Judge did not adequately support several findings about Vogelsang’s ability to concentrate, interact with others, adapt, and manage herself. The court also found that the judge did not properly evaluate medical opinions stating that Vogelsang needed supervision or assistance to function independently at work.
Judge Parker granted Vogelsang’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded the case for the Administrative Law Judge to reconsider it consistently with the opinion. The court did not itself decide that Vogelsang was entitled to benefits.
The detailed version
- Vogelsang v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 1:21-cv-09338
- Katharine Parker
- Feb. 22, 2023
Background
Cally Morgan Vogelsang sought review under the Social Security Act of the Commissioner’s decision that she was not disabled as of August 13, 1999, and therefore was not eligible for Child’s Insurance Benefits or Supplemental Security Income. She has diagnoses including autism spectrum disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, selective mutism, anxiety, intellectual disability, speech delay, and hearing loss. She received extensive special-education services, had difficulty functioning independently, and left college after about one month because she found the experience overwhelming.
After a prior remand by the agency’s Appeals Council, Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Stacchini issued a January 25, 2021 decision finding that Vogelsang was not disabled. The judge found severe impairments but concluded that they did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. He found that Vogelsang could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to limits including simple, routine, repetitive tasks; scheduled breaks; limited interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; no tandem tasks; and a moderate noise level. Based on vocational-expert testimony, he identified work as a hand packer, laundry sorter, and laundry worker.
Court’s analysis
The court first found that the Administrative Law Judge provided a full and fair hearing and fully developed the administrative record. It then reviewed whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence—relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate—and whether the correct legal standards were used.
The court held that the Administrative Law Judge’s findings concerning the “paragraph B” areas of concentration, persistence, and pace; interaction with others; and adapting and managing oneself were not supported by substantial evidence. The judge found only mild or moderate limitations, but the court found that the decision did not adequately explain those findings and failed to account for evidence that Vogelsang struggled to maintain tasks, communicate, manage daily activities, and function without assistance. The court also found the decision internally inconsistent because the judge credited opinions from agency consultants that reflected limitations greater than the mild limitation assigned in one area.
The court further held that the Administrative Law Judge inadequately evaluated the “paragraph C” criteria concerning marginal adjustment, meaning a minimal ability to adapt to changes or new demands. The decision did not adequately address Vogelsang’s inability to cope with college, including her panic attacks and feeling overwhelmed, or explain why that evidence was insufficient.
The court also found legal error in the handling of four medical opinions. The Administrative Law Judge rejected or failed to meaningfully discuss opinions from Drs. Maryam Banikazemi, Vega Lalire, Quazi Al-Tariq, and Kelli Meland-Lewis indicating that Vogelsang required supervision, assistance, or support to function independently. The court stated that the judge was required to consider the opinions’ supportability—how well each opinion was explained and supported—and consistency with the rest of the record. The court also found that the judge improperly relied on selected daily activities without adequately reconciling evidence that Vogelsang depended on her mother for appointments, communication, medication reminders, meals, and other tasks.
Because the residual functional capacity finding did not include specialized or enhanced supervision, and because the vocational expert testified that more than occasional interaction with supervisors would prevent the identified jobs, the court found that these errors were not harmless. The court noted that Vogelsang’s need for supervision might conflict with her social-anxiety-related need for limited interaction, but that tension did not justify ignoring the evidence.
Disposition
The court granted Vogelsang’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. It remanded the case for reconsideration by the Administrative Law Judge consistent with the opinion. The court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment remanding the case and close the case. The court did not decide that Vogelsang was entitled to benefits.
Read the full 33-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.