Chowdhury v. Veon Ltd.

Background

Nayeem A. Chowdhury, representing himself, sued VEON Ltd. and the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) over the sale of electromagnetic spectrum bands in Bangladesh. He alleged that BTRC auctioned part of the spectrum that WorldTel Bangladesh Limited claimed to own and that VEON, through a subsidiary, won rights to that spectrum. He alleged that WorldTel had assigned its claims to him.

The court had dismissed Chowdhury’s original complaint on March 30, 2022. It dismissed the claims against BTRC because the agency was protected by sovereign immunity, meaning it generally could not be sued in United States courts absent an applicable exception. It dismissed the claims against VEON because Chowdhury had not shown that he had standing, meaning a legally sufficient right to bring those claims. The court allowed him to amend only his claims against VEON and terminated BTRC from the action.

Motion for Reconsideration

Chowdhury asked the court to reconsider the earlier dismissal of BTRC. He relied on a licensing agreement involving WorldTel and argued that it waived BTRC’s sovereign immunity. The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally limited to an intervening change in controlling law, genuinely new evidence, or a need to correct clear error or prevent serious injustice.

The court denied the motion. It concluded that the licensing agreement was not new evidence because Chowdhury had referred to it in his original complaint and had apparently possessed it when the earlier motion was litigated. The documents provided by BTRC did not show a waiver of immunity. Instead, the 2001 license agreement provided for informal resolution or arbitration of disputes. The court therefore found no basis to reconsider BTRC’s dismissal.

VEON’s Motion to Dismiss

VEON moved to dismiss the amended complaint on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction means the court’s legal authority over a defendant. The court addressed that issue first and ended its analysis there.

Chowdhury argued that VEON was subject to general jurisdiction in New York because it was listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange, had an agent for service of process in New York, and had been involved in other litigation in the United States. The court rejected those grounds. It stated that the amended complaint did not allege that VEON was incorporated in New York or had its principal place of business there, and that the listed contacts did not make VEON essentially at home in New York.

Chowdhury also relied on New York’s long-arm statute to argue for specific jurisdiction based on an alleged tort outside New York that caused an in-state injury. The court concluded that the alleged injury was to WorldTel, not Chowdhury personally. It further found no allegation that WorldTel had a sufficient New York presence to suffer an injury there. According to the court, WorldTel’s alleged assignment of claims to Chowdhury could not, by itself, create personal jurisdiction over VEON.

Because Chowdhury had not adequately alleged a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction under New York law, the court did not reach the separate question whether jurisdiction would satisfy constitutional due-process requirements. The court granted VEON’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

Although Chowdhury did not request permission to amend again, the court granted him leave to file a Second Amended Complaint concerning VEON. The court cited the fact that he had amended only once, that the earlier amendment had corrected some deficiencies, and that discovery had not yet occurred. The court allowed only one final amendment and stated that it should be filed only if Chowdhury could plead facts establishing personal jurisdiction over VEON.

Judge John P. Cronan’s order denied Chowdhury’s motion for reconsideration, granted VEON’s motion to dismiss, and granted Chowdhury leave to amend one final time as to VEON. Any further amended complaint had to be filed within thirty days. The clerk was directed to terminate BTRC from the action.