Max v. Urbach Lissner

Background

Libra Max sued Barbara H. Urbach Lissner in federal court. Max alleged that Lissner, who had been appointed as Peter Max’s personal-needs guardian, isolated Peter Max from family members, restricted visits and telephone calls, removed cats from his home, limited Max’s access to medical information, and made false statements in the guardianship proceeding and in a state-court defamation case.

The complaint asserted three claims: intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; violation of New York’s anti-SLAPP law, which can allow a defamation defendant to seek damages when a defamation case lacks a substantial factual and legal basis; and violation of New York Judiciary Law § 487, which addresses attorney deceit intended to mislead a court or party. Lissner moved to dismiss for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

Emotional-Distress Claim

The court granted dismissal of Max’s emotional-distress claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal district courts from acting as appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments.

The court concluded that the emotional-distress claim was based on decisions and actions that the state guardianship court had repeatedly approved, including restrictions on visitation, control over care arrangements, and the removal of Peter Max’s cats. Max had also raised similar complaints in several state guardianship applications. Because deciding the federal claim would require the federal court to second-guess those state-court decisions, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court stated that dismissal of this claim was granted with prejudice.

Anti-SLAPP Claim

The court construed Max’s anti-SLAPP claim as arising under New York Civil Rights Law § 70-a, rather than § 76-a. The court held that such a claim could be brought in federal court. It also found that Max adequately alleged that the statements involved a matter of public interest.

The court nevertheless dismissed the claim because Max did not adequately allege that Lissner’s defamation case lacked a substantial basis in fact and law. Max made broad assertions that the defamation case was frivolous and false, but did not connect those assertions to the particular statements at issue or explain which statements were true, opinions, or incapable of defamatory meaning. The court stated that Max could seek leave to file an amended complaint limited to the anti-SLAPP claim, provided any motion for leave was made by March 17, 2023. The court also noted that, even if adequately pleaded, the claim would likely raise grounds for pausing the federal case because it was closely connected to the pending state defamation case.

Judiciary Law § 487 Claim

The court assumed without deciding that it had jurisdiction over Max’s claim under New York Judiciary Law § 487. It held that the claim nevertheless failed as a matter of law. The alleged statements were made either during the guardianship proceeding in which Max participated or in the defamation case pending in the guardianship part. Under the law discussed by the court, a party aware of alleged attorney deceit during an existing proceeding must raise the issue in that same proceeding. The court therefore stated that Max had to bring this claim in the guardianship part.

Disposition

The court granted Barbara Lissner’s motion to dismiss. The emotional-distress claim was dismissed with prejudice. The anti-SLAPP claim was dismissed, subject to Max’s ability to seek leave to amend by the stated deadline. The court also granted dismissal of the remaining claims, including the Judiciary Law § 487 claim, and directed the Clerk to terminate the motion entry.