Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
←Back to docket
S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 10, 2023

Mallo v. Vance

Judge
Andrew Carter
Docket
1:21-cv-10488
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
8
HabeasCivil ProcedureSection 1983Pro Se
In one sentence

In Mallo v. Vance, Judge Carter dismissed Mallo’s complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Who this affects

Daniel Mallo, who represented himself, and defendants Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Emily Bradford, and Jerrold Steigman. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice, ending the federal case.

What happened

In Mallo v. Vance, Daniel Mallo challenged his New York state criminal conviction and asked a federal court to vacate and expunge it. He sought relief under a federal law allowing challenges to state custody and, alternatively, under a civil-rights statute.

Mallo had finished his sentence and parole before filing the federal case. The court ruled that he was not in the custody required for the federal challenge to his conviction. It also ruled that his civil-rights claims improperly asked the federal court to review and overturn a state-court judgment.

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that amendment would be futile, declined to allow amendment, closed the case, and directed that a copy of the opinion be mailed to Mallo.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Mallo v. Vance · No. 1:21-cv-10488
Judge
Andrew Carter
Date
Mar. 10, 2023

Background

Daniel Mallo, who was representing himself, sued Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Emily Bradford, and Jerrold Steigman in their individual and official capacities. The opinion describes Vance as the former New York County District Attorney and Bradford and Steigman as former assistant district attorneys. Alvin L. Bragg, Jr. was automatically substituted for Vance as his successor in interest.

Mallo was convicted after a trial in New York County Supreme Court of second-degree grand larceny based on fabricating a mental-health disorder to fraudulently obtain Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. He received a fine, restitution, and a prison term of 18 to 54 months. The First Department affirmed his conviction. State courts later denied two motions to vacate the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal those rulings.

The New York Department of Corrections told Mallo on April 26, 2021, that he had completed his sentence and had been discharged from parole. He filed this federal action on December 8, 2021. He asked the court to vacate and expunge his conviction and restore his rights. He alleged that errors by prosecutors and the state trial court violated federal and state law, including his rights to present a defense and receive a fair trial.

Defendants’ Motion

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court resolved the case under Rule 12(b)(1) and did not discuss the defendants’ additional arguments based on claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or failure to state a claim.

Habeas Claim

Mallo sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a procedure for challenging state custody in federal court. The court explained that a person must be “in custody” under the conviction or sentence being challenged when the petition is filed. Being on supervised release or probation can satisfy that requirement, but collateral consequences of a fully completed sentence generally do not.

The court found that Mallo’s early discharge from parole on April 26, 2021, meant he was no longer in custody when he filed the action on December 8, 2021. The court therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction over his § 2254 claim.

Civil-Rights Claims

Mallo pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an alternative to his habeas claim. The court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents federal district courts from acting as appeals courts for state-court judgments.

The court found all four requirements satisfied: Mallo had lost in state court; he complained of injuries caused by his state conviction; he asked the federal court to review and reject that conviction; and the state judgment came before this federal case. Because granting Mallo’s requested relief would completely reverse his state conviction, the court held that it also lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the remainder of the complaint.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Mallo’s complaint with prejudice. It stated that amendment would be futile and therefore did not grant leave to amend. The Clerk was directed to terminate pending motions, close the case, and mail the opinion and order to Mallo.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.