Araujo v. United States
- Valerie Caproni
- 1:22-cv-04056
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 13
In Araujo v. United States, Judge Caproni denied Araujo’s challenge to his guilty plea and sentence, finding no ineffective assistance.
Edwin Araujo, whose Section 2255 challenge was denied; the United States; and the conviction and 125-month consecutive sentence he sought to vacate.
What happened
In Araujo v. United States, Edwin Araujo asked the court to set aside his conviction and sentence, arguing that his lawyer gave inaccurate advice about whether his sentence would run concurrently with an earlier sentence and pressured him to give incorrect facts during his guilty plea.
The court found that Araujo understood the possible sentences, including that the court could impose a consecutive sentence, and that his sworn statements showed his plea was voluntary and supported by an adequate factual basis. The court also found that Araujo had not shown that his lawyer’s actions were unreasonable or that he would rationally have rejected the plea agreement and gone to trial.
Judge Valerie Caproni denied Araujo’s petition under Section 2255. She also declined to issue a certificate allowing an appeal, denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees, and directed the clerk to close the motion.
The detailed version
- Araujo v. United States · No. 1:22-cv-04056
- Valerie Caproni
- Mar. 21, 2023
Background
Edwin Araujo pleaded guilty to one count of racketeering conspiracy in 2018. The plea agreement stated that his sentencing exposure was capped at 20 years, while the indictment’s charges carried a mandatory minimum of 17 years and a maximum of life imprisonment. The agreement also recognized that any sentence could run either consecutively to or concurrently with the undischarged portion of his sentence in an earlier pharmacy-burglaries case.
In May 2019, the court sentenced Araujo to 125 months in prison, within the stated sentencing-guidelines range, to run consecutively to his earlier sentence. Before sentencing, the court considered allegations that Araujo had operated a substantial drug- and cell-phone-smuggling operation from prison. Araujo did not dispute those allegations in the proceedings described in the opinion. His direct appeal was dismissed because the Second Circuit found that his plea agreement waived his right to appeal.
Araujo’s Section 2255 Petition
Araujo later filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence based on specified serious errors. He argued that his attorney, Aaron Mysliwiec, provided ineffective assistance by misrepresenting that the new sentence would run concurrently with the earlier sentence. Araujo also alleged that counsel directed him to make statements inconsistent with the facts during his guilty-plea hearing and failed to challenge the plea’s factual basis.
The court treated Araujo’s filing as a self-represented petition. Under the governing two-part test, a petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the deficient performance caused prejudice. In the guilty-plea context, prejudice requires showing a reasonable probability that rejecting the plea would have been a rational choice under the circumstances or that the petitioner would have pursued a viable defense.
Ineffective-Assistance Claim About Sentencing Advice
The court rejected Araujo’s argument that counsel had promised a concurrent sentence. Counsel’s sworn affidavit said that he did not recall making such a promise and instead advised Araujo that he would argue for a concurrent sentence and a lower sentence. The court also relied on the plea-hearing record, where Araujo confirmed that he understood the court alone would determine his sentence and that no one could assure or predict the sentence.
The court held that, even if counsel had advised Araujo that a concurrent sentence was likely, that advice would not by itself establish ineffective assistance because Araujo was warned about the actual sentencing possibilities. The plea agreement expressly covered both consecutive and concurrent sentences. The court therefore concluded that Araujo failed to show objectively unreasonable performance.
The court further stated that Araujo could not show prejudice. The plea agreement capped his exposure at 20 years, avoiding the possibility of a sentence exceeding 20 years or a life sentence. The court found that Araujo had not shown it would have been rational to reject that agreement and risk the indictment’s substantially greater sentencing exposure, and he did not identify a basis for doubting the strength of the Government’s case.
Guilty Plea and Factual Basis
The court also rejected Araujo’s claim that counsel coerced him to misstate the facts. During the plea hearing, Araujo admitted that he acted as a lookout for an attempted robbery of a gambling location. After initially saying that no one was expected to be there, he clarified, after conferring with counsel, that he understood someone might be present and that the plan was to use a gun to demand money if someone was there.
The court noted that Araujo appeared before it several times between his guilty plea and sentencing and did not challenge that account. When Araujo later considered changing lawyers, he received advice from a second, independent attorney and chose to remain with Mr. Mysliwiec. Araujo then confirmed under oath that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance and did not want to withdraw his guilty plea.
The court held that Araujo’s sworn statements showed that the plea was knowing and voluntary and that an adequate factual basis supported it. Because the plea had an adequate factual basis, the court also concluded that counsel’s failure to challenge that basis did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Disposition
The court held that Araujo satisfied neither part of the ineffective-assistance test and denied his Section 2255 petition. Judge Valerie Caproni found no constitutional error or fundamental defect. The court denied a certificate of appealability because Araujo had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without paying filing fees. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion at docket entry 700 and mail Araujo a copy of the opinion.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.